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Incompetent but Deportable: 




Important strides are currently being made toward increasing procedural due process 
protections for noncitizens with serious mental disabilities in removal proceedings, such 
as providing them with competency hearings and appointed counsel. This Article goes 
even further, arguing that courts should recognize a substantive due process right to 
competence in removal proceedings, which would prevent those found mentally 
incompetent from being deported. Recognizing a right to competence in a quasi-criminal 
proceeding such as removal would not be unprecedented, as most states already 
recognize this right in juvenile adjudication proceedings. The Article demonstrates that 
the same reasons underlying the prohibition against trial of incompetent defendants apply 
to removal proceedings. Competence is necessary to protect the fairness and accuracy of 
the proceedings, safeguard statutory and constitutional rights, uphold the prohibition 
against in absentia hearings, and preserve the moral dignity of the process. In addition 
removal can represent an extension of the criminal process. This Article explores 
potential concerns about recognizing a right to competence, such as exposing the 
respondent to indefinite civil commitment and forfeiting the opportunity to pursue 
applications that could lead to being granted legal status by the immigration court. A 
closer examination of these concerns suggests that they may be less serious than they 
initially appear. Finally, the Article explores some alternatives to recognizing a right to 
competence and explains why they fail to provide sufficient protection.  
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Introduction 
While the prohibition against trying mentally incompetent 
defendants has deep roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the rights 
of incompetent individuals in civil proceedings remains underexplored by 
both courts and scholars. Incompetent individuals have traditionally 
benefited from a spectrum of procedural due process protections in civil 
cases but generally have no substantive right to competence.1 This 
dichotomous approach to competency in criminal and civil cases has led 
courts to downplay the real challenges posed by incompetency in high-
stakes civil cases. “Quasi-criminal” cases, those that are technically civil 
but that can result in severe penalties akin to or even exceeding criminal 
punishment, present the toughest questions regarding the types of 
protections that mentally incompetent individuals should receive.2 
Removal proceedings represent one type of “quasi-criminal” case, as 
deportation is a “particularly severe penalty”3 that may result in the “loss 
of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living.”4
 
 1. See, e.g., Nee Hao Wong v. Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 550 F.2d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 
1977) (holding that due process does not require deportation proceedings to be postponed until a 
noncitizen is competent to participate intelligently in the proceedings); Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 
1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that “aliens are entitled only to procedural due process, which 
provides the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” and that 
“contrary to the substantive due process protection from trial and conviction to which a mentally 
incompetent criminal defendant is entitled . . . removal proceedings may go forward against 
incompetent aliens” (emphasis added)); Mohamed v. TeBrake, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 (D. Minn. 
2005) (finding, without explanation, that “[t]he substantive competency principle has no corollary in 
immigration proceedings”). 
 
 2. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and 
Civil Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1797–98 (1992) (arguing that “the bifurcation of legal sanctions into 
two categories is misleading,” as “punitive civil sanctions are rapidly expanding,” which raises “serious 
doubt . . . about whether conventional civil procedure is suited for an unconventional civil law”); Carol 
S. Steiker, Foreward: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 771, 774–77 
(1998) (explaining how the state sometimes acts as “preventer of crime and disorder,” rather than 
“punisher,” through institutions such as the civil commitment process, and discussing the 
constitutional or policy limits that might apply to such “preventive” practices). 
 3. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 1103, 1117 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) 
(“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the 
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That 
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Important strides are currently being made toward increasing the 
procedural due process protections for immigration detainees with 
serious mental disabilities, such as providing them competency hearings 
and appointed counsel.5 Yet even these watershed changes do not go far 
enough.6 Because a mentally incompetent individual cannot assist counsel, 
simply providing a representative fails to resolve troubling questions 
regarding the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings. Someone who 
does not know or cannot communicate where she was born, how she 
arrived in the United States, or how long she has lived here, much less 
her family’s history, might derive little benefit from having an attorney. 
The attorney would need such basic information to determine if the 
person is actually deportable and assess her eligibility for relief from 
removal. To complicate matters, an incompetent client may even give the 
attorney wrong information, which could cloud the attorney’s entire 
analysis. In numerous cases, U.S. citizens with serious mental disabilities 
have been wrongfully detained and deported, often based on their own 
inaccurate statements about their birthplace and nationality.7
One of the worst situations is where a noncitizen faces a real risk of 
persecution or torture in her country of origin, but her mental disabilities 
prevent her from being able to provide the type of consistent and credible 
testimony that is necessary to obtain asylum. A lawyer can certainly help 
prepare the case but stands largely powerless when it comes to a client’s 
inability to testify coherently. In this scenario, the client’s disabilities 
clearly render the proceeding unreliable, yet a deportation order could 
 
 
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of 
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289, 290–91 (2008) (arguing that only 
civil due process protections should apply to the determination of whether to exclude a noncitizen 
from entering the United States, but the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded to criminal 
defendants should apply to the determination of whether to deport a lawful permanent resident). See 
generally Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299 (2011) (examining 
the trajectory of Supreme Court cases regarding the quasi-criminal nature of deportation 
proceedings). 
 5. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Department of 
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented 
Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedImmigrationDetainees.html. 
 6. This Article uses the term “mental disabilities” to include mental illnesses as well as cognitive or 
developmental delays, because both types of disabilities may lead individuals to be legally incompetent. 
 7. In 2007, for example, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) wrongfully 
deported Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen with development disabilities, who was lost in Mexico for 
almost three months before being located and returned to California. He allegedly told ICE officers, 
Customs and Border Patrol officials, and others that he was born in Mexico. See Paloma Esquivel, Suit 
Filed Over Man’s Deportation Ordeal, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 2008, at 4. In 2008, ICE deported a U.S. 
citizen named Mark Lyttle, who had bipolar disorder and development disabilities, after he signed a 
statement verifying that he was a Mexican national. See Human Rights Watch, Deportation by 
Default: Mental Disability, Unfair Hearings, and Indefinite Detention in the US Immigration 
System 4 (2010) [hereinafter Deportation by Default]. 
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ensue with potentially life-threatening consequences. Criminal trials do 
not proceed if the defendant cannot assist with the defense because we 
recognize that any trial would be unfair if the defendant cannot 
communicate exonerating information. Yet we expect removal hearings 
to proceed even if the respondent cannot convey crucial information that 
could stop her deportation. 
This Article argues that the same reasons underlying the prohibition 
against trial of incompetent defendants support recognizing a substantive 
right to competence in removal proceedings. The rationales for a right to 
mental competence in criminal cases include: preserving the accuracy 
and reliability of the proceedings; protecting other rights that cannot be 
exercised if incompetent, including the right to be present during the 
proceedings; and safeguarding the dignity of the process.8 These same 
concerns apply in the removal context but removal has also become an 
extension of the criminal process, with immigration consequences flowing 
directly from arrest, investigation, detention, and conviction.9
Mapping the spectrum of mental competence against the spectrum of 
due process protection provides a useful framework for analyzing issues of 
competence. On one end of the competence spectrum are individuals 
who are not competent to stand trial or face removal, even when 
represented by counsel. The Supreme Court defined this standard of 
competence in Dusky v. United States
 The 
integrated nature of immigration enforcement and criminal proceedings 
underscores the importance of adopting a consistent approach for 
questions of mental competence. 
10 and Drope v. Missouri.11 Further 
along the spectrum are individuals who are competent to stand trial or 
face removal but lack the higher level of competence necessary for self-
representation. The Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of this 
category in Indiana v. Edwards, although it did not define the heightened 
standard of competence.12
 
 8. See, e.g., Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 457–58 (1967). 
 Finally, some individuals demonstrate the 
higher level of competence necessary to represent themselves. 
 9. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1143–56 (2013) (describing how the immigration system 
functions as part of the criminal system and how immigration enforcement and criminal punishment 
involve an “integrated process”). 
 10. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that the standard for 
competence to stand trial “must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”) 
 11. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that 
he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult 
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). 
 12. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008) (holding that states may impose a higher 
standard of competency for self-representation). 
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Each of these groups along the spectrum of competence corresponds 
to a different level of due process protection. For the first group, those 
who are not competent under Dusky/Drope, due process requires 
termination of the proceedings, which is analogous to dismissal.13 For the 
middle group of individuals, those who are competent to stand trial but 
lack the higher competence necessary for self-representation, attorneys 
must be appointed. This would represent a significant change from the 
current removal system in which individuals have the privilege of 
obtaining representation at their own expense.14
Part I of this Article provides relevant background information about 
the prevalence of mental disabilities among individuals in removal 
proceedings and emphasizes that only a small fraction of these individuals 
would qualify as legally incompetent under the Dusky/Drope standard. 
Recognizing a right to competence would not, therefore, pose a major 
obstacle to immigration enforcement. Part II sets forth the standards for 
competency in both criminal and civil proceedings, exploring specifically 
how issues of incompetency are handled in two types of quasi-criminal 
cases: juvenile adjudications and habeas petitions. This discussion shows 
that recognizing a substantive right to competence in a technically civil 
proceeding is not unprecedented, as most states have already recognized 
this right in juvenile delinquency cases.
 If an attorney could not 
be appointed, then the case would have to be terminated. Only members 
of the third group, those who demonstrate the heightened competence 
required for self-representation, would be allowed to proceed pro se. 
15 Moreover, the reasoning of 
state courts overlaps with the rationale for prohibiting the trial of 
incompetent defendants and helps shape the arguments for recognizing a 
right to competence in removal proceedings. This same rationale does 
not, however, apply to backward-looking habeas proceedings, which bear 
none of the trappings of a trial. The Supreme Court’s recent decision 
finding no right to competence in capital habeas proceedings therefore 
poses no obstacle to the arguments proposed in this Article.16
 
 13. Termination differs from administrative closure, which simply involves taking the case off the 
docket and putting it on hold indefinitely. Requiring immigration judges to terminate cases based on 
mental incompetence creates tension with 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (2014), which appears to authorize 
immigration judges to terminate only in order to allow the respondent to pursue naturalization. One 
solution is for the regulation to be amended to authorize judges to terminate in cases of mental 
incompetency. Alternatively, courts could apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and construe 
the regulation as permitting immigration judges to terminate where the respondent is mentally 
incompetent. Courts could also simply find that the regulation conflicts with a constitutional due 
process right to competence and is therefore invalid. 
 
 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented, 
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in 
such proceedings.”). 
 15. See infra notes 110–131 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700 (2013). 
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Part III reviews how immigration courts currently handle issues of 
mental competence, explaining that removal proceedings resemble mini-
trials, much like juvenile adjudications, yet provide minimal protections 
for incompetent respondents. Recent developments promise a change in 
procedural rights, such as appointment of counsel for mentally 
incompetent individuals who are detained, but there has been no 
discussion about whether incompetent individuals may be subjected to 
the removal process and ordered deported in the first place.17
Part IV argues that courts should recognize a substantive right to 
competence in removal proceedings, explaining how each of the 
arguments underlying the criminal prohibition applies equally to the 
removal context. This substantive right would have two tiers, such that a 
higher threshold of competence would be required for self-representation. 
Part V explores potential concerns with recognizing a right to mental 
competence, including the risk of civil commitment and the forfeiture of 
a chance to obtain lawful status from the immigration court. While these 
are important concerns, this Article offers some reasons why the risks 
may actually be lower than they initially appear. Finally, for those who 
remain wary of recognizing a right to competence, Part VI discusses 
some alternatives, including discretionary termination by immigration 
judges, prosecutorial discretion by the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”), and a novel disability rights framework that utilizes a 
reasonable accommodation approach for advancing the right to counsel. 
Part VI explains why these alternatives may not provide sufficient 
protection. This Article concludes that recognizing a substantive right to 
competence, or creating an analogous statutory right, would be the best 
way to ensure across-the-board protection for mentally incompetent 
individuals in removal proceedings. 
 Reforms 
addressing procedural due process rights are important and necessary to 
identify which respondents are legally incompetent, but they do not 
address the problem of what to do after someone is deemed incompetent. 
The recent developments also fail to address appointment of counsel for 
non-detained incompetent individuals who lack the heightened 
competency necessary for self-representation. 
I.  Mental Disabilities Among Individuals Facing Deportation 
U.S. immigration law has never been welcoming toward individuals 
with mental disabilities. In fact, early immigration laws steadily expanded 
the list of mental disabilities that resulted in exclusion. The Immigration 
 
 17. In April 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) announced a brand new policy that promises competency hearings and appointed 
representatives to detained noncitizens with serious mental disabilities. See Press Release, Dep’t of 
Justice, supra note 5. 
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Act of 1891, for example, excluded “[a]ll idiots” and “insane persons.”18 
In 1907, the list included: “idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, 
epileptics, [and] insane persons.”19 By 1917, the United States excluded 
“[a]ll idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons; 
persons who have had one or more attacks of insanity at any time 
previously; persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” and any 
other persons found to be “mentally . . . defective.”20 Today, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) excludes individuals with a 
mental disorder only if they pose a danger to themselves or others.21 But 
tens of thousands of noncitizens with mental disabilities still face 
deportation each year.22 Some of these individuals suffer from cognitive 
delays or traumatic brain injuries, while others have serious psychiatric 
disorders, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or posttraumatic stress 
disorder. They often must navigate the complex removal process alone, 
while detained, without access to proper medical or mental healthcare, and 
without the assistance of counsel. Some actively experience hallucinations 
while in court; others do not know the current date, their place of birth, or 
cannot grasp the concept of a judge, much less the notion of deportation.23
Only limited quantitative information is available regarding 
noncitizens with mental disabilities in removal proceedings.
 
24 In 2008, the 
Department of Immigrant Health Services reported that 2–5% of 
immigration detainees suffer from “a serious and persistent mental illness” 
and 10–16% of detainees had experienced “some form of encounter with a 
mental health professional or the mental health system.”25
 
 18. Immigration Act of 1891 § 1, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (excluding, among others, “[a]ll idiots, 
insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, [and] persons suffering from a 
loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease”). 
 In confidential 
memoranda, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
estimated that approximately 15% of the detained immigration 
 19. Immigration Act of 1907, § 2, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. 
 20. Immigration Act of 1917 § 3, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (2013) (excluding individuals with mental disorders if they 
demonstrate “behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the 
property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others,” or if they have a history of such behavior that is 
likely to recur or lead to other harmful behavior). 
 22. See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 6, 25–26. 
 24. Neither ICE, which is part of DHS, nor the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”), which is an agency within the Department of Justice that includes the immigration courts 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), tracks these numbers. Attempts by Human Rights 
Watch to obtain this data through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests have also 
proved inconclusive. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7. 
 25. Selected Responses from ICE to Questions Posed by The Washington Post Regarding the 
Provision of Mental Health Care to Immigration Detainees, Wash. Post (May 2008), 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/documents/ 
day3_ice_mentalhealth.gif. The percentages indicate that around 7500 to 19,000 individuals detained in 
2008 had a serious mental illness, and around 38,000 to 60,000 had a mental health encounter. 
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population includes noncitizens with a mental illness.26 This is a significant 
number of people, given that over 400,000 individuals pass through ICE 
detention each year.27 Consistent with the 15% figure, ICE performed 
57,982 mental health interventions in 2011.28 These numbers suggest that 
up to 60,000 detained individuals with some type of mental illness face 
deportation each year.29 Many non-detained individuals in removal 
proceedings also have mental disabilities, although the rates are usually 
much lower among the general population compared to the incarcerated 
population.30 About one in seventeen adults (6%) lives with a serious 
mental illness such as schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar 
disorder.31
Of course, the mere existence of a mental disability does not render 
someone legally incompetent.
 
32 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
mental illness “is not a unitary concept” but one that “varies in degree 
[and] can vary over time . . . interfer[ing] with an individual’s functioning 
at different times and in different ways.”33 Only the most extreme cases 
tend to result in findings of legal incompetence to stand trial.34 In the 
criminal context, 20–30% of defendants referred for competency 
evaluations are found to be incompetent.35
 
 26. Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Suicides Point to Gaps in Treatment: Errors in Psychiatric 
Diagnoses and Drugs Plague Strained Immigration System, Wash. Post, May 13, 2008, at A1. 
 While only a fraction of the 
 27. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ERO Facts and Statistics (Dec. 12, 2011), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/ero-facts-and-statistics.pdf. 
 28. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: ERO—Detainee Health Care—
FY 2011, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/dhc-fy11.pdf. 
 29. Cf. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 17 (estimating that the number of persons 
appearing in immigration proceedings who have mental disabilities is at least fifteen percent of the 
daily or annual total). 
 30. The National Alliance on Mental Illness reports that twenty-four percent of state prisoners 
and twenty-one percent of local jail prisoners have a recent history of a mental health disorder. 
According to one report, there are now three times as many people with serious mental illnesses in 
jails than in hospitals. See E. Fuller Torrey et al., Treatment Advocacy Ctr., More Mentally Ill 
People are in Jails and Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States at II(b) (May 2010).  
 31. Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, Mental Illness: Facts and Numbers (2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1970) (“The presence of some 
degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily mean that he is incompetent to . . . 
assist in his own defense.”). 
 33. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 165 (2008). 
 34. Individuals with diagnosed psychotic disorders and histories of past psychiatric 
hospitalizations are particularly likely to be found incompetent. A meta-analysis of sixty-eight studies 
published between 1968 and 2008 that compared competent and incompetent criminal defendants 
using a number of variables found that those diagnosed with a psychotic disorder were eight times more 
likely to be found incompetent than defendants without this diagnosis, and that defendants with a 
previous psychiatric hospitalization were twice as likely to be found incompetent as defendants who had 
not been hospitalized. See Gianni Pirelli, William H. Gottdiener & Patricia A. Zapf, A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Competency to Stand Trial Research, 17 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1, 7, 16–17 (2011). 
 35. See Pirelli et al., supra note 34, at 3 (suggesting a figure of around 20%, although the rates 
vary across jurisdictions); Gary Melton et al., Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A 
Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers 141 (3d ed. 2007) (indicating a figure of 
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respondents in removal proceedings are therefore likely to qualify as 
legally incompetent, it is shocking that DHS requested competency 
evaluations in just 429 cases between 2004 and 2010.36 This number 
indicates that the government has largely ignored questions of mental 
competency in the removal context. Given that over 300,000 people are 
placed in removal proceedings each year,37
When serious mental disabilities are ignored, the consequences can 
be devastating. Recent investigations into deaths in immigration detention 
centers revealed significant numbers of suicides.
 one would expect a much 
higher number of referrals for competency evaluations. 
38 These suicides could be 
related to ICE’s failure to provide detainees with appropriate mental 
healthcare.39 After the suicides came to light, ICE’s Office of Detention 
Oversight began paying closer attention to compliance with various 
standards. In 2011 and 2012, this office inspected detention facilities 
throughout the United States and found numerous deficiencies that 
impact the care of detainees with serious mental illnesses, ranging from 
failure to place medical grievances in files to involuntary administration 
of medical treatment.40
 
around 30%); Ronald Roesch & Stephen Golding, Competency to Stand Trial 48–49 (1980) 
(reporting a figure of 30% on average); cf. Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in 
Preadjudicatory Juveniles and Adults, 26 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 89, 94–95 (1998) (finding, in a 
sample of 112 juveniles referred for competency evaluations, that 15% were found incompetent). 
 The widespread mistreatment of mentally ill 
 36. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 12. 
 37. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2012 Statistical Year 
Book, at C3, tbl. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf. 
 38. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Say Detainee Fatalities Were Missed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2009, 
at A10; see also U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, List of Deaths in ICE Custody: 
October 2003–December 6, 2012 (showing 131 deaths total and suggesting that about nineteen deaths 
were suicides out of 119 for which the cause of death was confirmed). 
 39. ICE has kept track of how much money it has “saved” by denying treatment for various 
mental illnesses. For example, between 2005 and 2006, ICE reported that it saved $43,158 by denying 
treatment for depressive disorder, $18,145 by denying treatment for manic-depressive disorder, 
$11,688 by denying treatment for unspecified psychosis, $7402 by denying treatment for paranoid 
schizophrenia, $6402 by denying treatment for unspecified affective disorders, and $5920 by denying 
treatment for prolonged posttraumatic stress disorder. Internal Document from Division of 
Immigration Health Services: TAR Cost Savings Based on Denials, Wash. Post (2008), 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/day2_tardocs.pdf. ICE also 
“saved” hundreds of thousands of dollars by denying treatment for a host of other conditions that may 
be psychosomatic in nature, such as the $91,926 saved by denying treatment for “unspecified chest 
pain” and over $55,000 saved by denying treatment for various types of abdominal pain. Id. 
 40. The deficiencies included: inadequate staffing to address the health needs of detainees; failure 
to provide a health exam within fourteen days of the detainee’s arrival at the facility; failure to meet 
healthcare needs in a timely manner; failure to treat chronic conditions properly; failure to place 
medical grievances in a detainee’s file; inadequate procedures to ensure that slips requesting medical 
care reach the proper officials; failure to follow procedures in distributing medication; involuntary 
administration of medical treatment (including involuntarily administration of psychotropic 
medications); and failure to provide regularly scheduled “sick calls.” See Office of Detention 
Oversight, Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Atlanta Field Office: 
York County Detention Center York, South Carolina (2013); Office of Detention Oversight, 
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detainees makes it even more urgent to consider whether these 
individuals should be subject to deportation in the first place. 
II.  Mental Competence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings 
A. Competence in Criminal Proceedings 
Dating back to the seventeenth century, authorities in English 
common law maintained that an incompetent defendant could not 
undergo a criminal trial, receive judgment, or be executed.41 These 
authorities explicitly tied the requirement of competence to the 
defendant’s capacity to communicate exonerating information to others. 
For example, Sir John Hawles observed that “a lunatick . . . is by an act 
of God . . . disabled to make his just defence,” as there “may be 
circumstances lying in his private knowledge, which would prove his 
innocency, of which he can have no advantage, because not known to the 
persons who shall take upon them his defence.”42
 
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Newark Field Office: Elizabeth 
Contract Detention Facility Newark, New Jersey (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, 
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Philadelphia Field Office: Clinton 
County Correctional Facility McElhattan, Pennsylvania (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, 
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Saint Paul Field Office: Ramsey 
County Adult Detention Center Saint Paul, Minnesota (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, 
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations San Francisco Field Office: 
Sacramento County Jail Sacramento, California (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, 
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Newark Field Office: Essex County 
Correctional Facility Newark, New Jersey (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, Compliance 
Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Miami Field Office: Broward Transition Center 
Pompano Beach, Florida (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, Compliance Inspection: 
Enforcement and Removal Operations Chicago Field Office: Jefferson County Justice Center 
Mount Vernon, Illinois (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, Compliance Inspection: 
Enforcement and Removal Operations New York Field Office: Hudson County Correctional 
Facility Kearny, New Jersey (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/foia/library. 
 William Blackstone 
 41. See, e.g., 1 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 35 (Prof’l Books 
Ltd. 1971) (1736) (“[I]f [a] person after his plea, and before his trial, become of non sane memory, he 
shall not be tried; or, if after his trial he become of non sane memory, he shall not receive judgment; 
or, if after judgment he become of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of 
sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution.”); see also Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (“The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent should 
not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage.”); Youtsey v. United States, 
97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) (collecting common law authorities discussing the prohibition against the 
trial of incompetent defendants). 
 42. Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman (1719), reprinted in 11 State 
Trials 473, 476 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816) (“[N]othing is more certain law, than that a person who falls 
mad after a crime supposed to be committed, shall not be tried for it; and if he falls mad after judgment he 
shall not be executed. . . . [T]he true reason of the law I think to be this, a person of ‘non sana memoria,’ 
and a lunatick during his lunacy, is by an act of God . . . disabled to make his just defence. There may be 
circumstances lying in his private knowledge, which would prove his innocency, of which he can have no 
advantage, because not known to the persons who shall take upon them his defence.”). 
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likewise questioned how a person who is “mad” can “make his defence”43 
and receive a fair trial when “the law knows not but he might have 
offered some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed [the] proceeding.”44 
Trials were therefore postponed until a date when the defendant “by 
collecting together his intellects, and having them entire, . . . shall be able 
to model his defense and to ward off the punishment of the law.”45
By the nineteenth century, U.S. courts had also addressed the issue 
of competence to stand trial. In 1899, the Sixth Circuit explained in 
Youtsey v. United States that “[i]t is not ‘due process of law’ to subject an 
insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life.”
 
46 In 
that case, “the defendant’s mind and memory, as a consequence of 
epileptic attacks, had become so impaired as that he was unable to advise 
his counsel as to his defense, or recall transactions which ought to have 
been within his knowledge,” and “he was unable, in consequence of his 
impaired mind and memory, to testify for himself.”47 The court remanded 
the case for “a thorough investigation of the sanity of the accused,” 
explaining that “the learned trial judge should have adopted some 
method of satisfying himself that the accused was able to rationally 
defend himself, before putting him on trial under the plea of not guilty.”48
Several rationales underlie the longstanding existence of the 
prohibition against the trial of incompetent defendants. Explicitly 
examining this rationale is helpful in considering whether a similar 
prohibition should apply in quasi-criminal contexts. First and foremost, the 




 43. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *24–25 (1769) (“[I]f a man in his sound memory 
commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be 
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, 
after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his 
defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not 
be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for 
peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might 
have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.”). 
 
An incompetent defendant may not understand what information is 
 44. See id. at *389; see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 n.11 (1993) (“[T]he prohibition 
against the trial of incompetent defendants dates back at least to the time of Blackstone.”). 
 45. Frith’s Case, 22 How. State Trials 307 (1790). 
 46. Youtsey, 97 F. 937, at 941. 
 47. Id. at 942. 
 48. See id. at 947; see also United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 289 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) (“Does 
the mental impairment of the prisoner’s mind, if such there be, whatever it is, disable him . . . from 
fairly presenting his defense, whatever it may be, and make it unjust to go on with his trial at this time, 
or is he feigning to be in that condition . . . ?”). 
 49. In 1906, a federal circuit court explained that it would be “a reproach to justice and our 
institutions, if a human being . . . were compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficiently in 
possession of his mental faculties to enable him to make a rational and proper defense.” Chisolm, 
149 F. at 288. In other words, the competency rule is one of “the great safeguards which the law adopts 
in the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice.” Id. 
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relevant to prove her innocence or may be unable to share that 
information with the court, which could contribute to an erroneous 
conviction.50 Second, the prohibition helps protect other constitutional 
rights, “including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to 
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to 
testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing 
so.”51 An incompetent defendant’s inability to meaningfully exercise 
these rights can also contribute to problems with accuracy.52 For 
example, an incompetent defendant may not be able to identify lies told 
by adversarial witnesses, whereas a competent defendant could point 
these out to her attorney, which would assist with cross-examination.53
Third, the prohibition against subjecting an incompetent defendant 
to trial is closely related to the prohibition against in absentia trials.
 
54 
Defendants have the right to be present at all stages of the criminal 
process. This right derives primarily from the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause, but also from the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.55 A mentally incompetent person is deprived of this right because 
she “may be as far removed from the proceedings as if physically 
absent.”56 Finally, the prohibition against trying incompetent individuals 
helps preserve the “moral dignity” of the defendant and the criminal 
process. If a defendant behaves “insane” in court, the legal process may 
appear undignified and unfair.57
 
 50. See supra notes 
 Some scholars have also argued that 
42–47 and accompanying text.  
 51. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–
40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). In rejecting Oklahoma’s clear and convincing evidence standard 
for proving incompetence, the Court emphasized that “the consequences of an erroneous 
determination of competence are dire,” as a defendant who “lacks the ability to communicate 
effectively with counsel, he may be unable to exercise other ‘rights deemed essential to a fair trial.’” 
Id. at 364. 
 52. See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.1(a) (2d ed. 2003). 
 53. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 750 (1987) (Marhsall, J., joined by Brennan, J. and 
Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the presence of the defendant “enhances the reliability of the 
factfinding process,” as it is often the defendant, not counsel, who “possesses the knowledge needed to 
expose inaccuracies in the witness’ answers,” and “[h]aving the defendant present ensures that these 
inaccuracies are called to the judge’s attention immediately.”). 
 54. The Supreme Court has noted that “[s]ome have viewed the common-law prohibition [against 
the trial of incompetent individuals] ‘as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally 
incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no 
opportunity to defend himself.’” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Caleb Foote, A 
Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 832, 834 (1960)). 
 55. See U.S. Const. amend. V, VI; see also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) 
(“The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment . . . but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in 
some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.”). 
 56. See Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963); see also Mohamed v. Gonzales, 
477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A mentally incompetent person, although physically present, is 
absent from the hearing for all practical purposes.”). 
 57. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008). 
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dignity requires the defendant to have “a meaningful moral understanding 
of wrongdoing and punishment.”58 Various theories of punishment are 
premised on an understanding of wrongdoing, so the absence of such an 
understanding undermines the purpose of prosecution.59
The prohibition against the trial of an incompetent defendant has 
both procedural and substantive due process components.
 
60 Procedural 
due process, which involves the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the 
defendant’s competence, requires a competency hearing whenever the 
evidence raises a “bona fide doubt” as to a defendant’s competence.61 
While there are “no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate 
the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed,” the range 
of relevant factors that may be sufficient to trigger a competency hearing 
include “a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any 
prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.”62 Indeed, “even one 
of these facts, standing alone, may be sufficient.”63
 
 58. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 
47 U. Miami L. Rev. 539, 543 (1993); see also Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 
 A mental health 
8, at 458 
(connecting the prohibition to “the philosophy of punishment that the defendant know why he is being 
punished”). 
 59. The Supreme Court’s decisions to categorically exclude mentally retarded individuals and 
juveniles from the death penalty invoked similar reasoning based on penological purposes. See Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002) (finding that imposition of the death penalty on a mentally 
retarded person does not serve the penological purposes of retribution and deterrence); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (“Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident 
that neither of the two penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence of 
capital crimes by prospective offenders . . . provides adequate justification for imposing that penalty on 
juveniles.”). The ability to distinguish right from wrong is part of the test for “insanity” as a defense, 
which provides a basis for mitigating punishment, but it is not part of the test for competence, which 
determines whether prosecution may occur at all. Cf. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 
718 (H.L.) 719, 722–23 (setting forth the standard for being found “insane” at the time of the offense); 
cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (setting forth the standard for competence to stand 
trial). In Atkins, the Supreme Court recognized that the “diminished capacities” of mentally retarded 
individuals justify exemption from the death penalty even if they are able to tell right from wrong 
under the M’Naghten standard. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 60. Cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curium) (establishing the right not to be 
subjected to trial if incompetent); cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1966) (recognizing a 
procedural right to a competency hearing in state prosecutions based on the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Walker v. Att’y Gen., 167 F.3d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(“[C]ompetency claims can raise issues of both substantive and procedural due process.”). 
 61. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385–86 (“Where the evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a 
sanity hearing pursuant to [the Illinois competency statute at issue].”); see also Porter v. McKaskle, 
466 U.S. 984, 985–86 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is settled that, if evidence available to a trial 
judge raises a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant’s ability to understand and participate in the 
proceedings against him, the judge has an obligation to order an examination to assess his competency, 
even if the defendant does not request such an exam.”). 
 62. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. 
 63. Id. Federal appeals courts have reversed lower courts for failing to conduct competency 
hearings in various situations, such as where: (1) the defendant could not communicate intelligently, 
had sustained a serious head injury, and had a family history of mental disturbance; (2) the defendant 
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evaluation is normally ordered by the court before a hearing on 
competence to stand trial. Each state has a mechanism for criminal courts 
to obtain a competency evaluation for a defendant.64 The defendant has 
the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.65 
Once a defendant is found to be incompetent, substantive due process 
requires freedom from criminal prosecution.66




1. Competence to Stand Trial 
 Much more recently, the Court recognized that a 
higher standard of competence may be required for self-representation. 
These two standards are discussed separately below since both are highly 
relevant to the removal context, followed by an explanation of the 
consequences of an incompetence finding. 
In 1960, the Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Dusky v. 
United States, which held that the standard for competence to stand trial 
“must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”68 In Drope v. Missouri, the Supreme Court 
expounded on this standard, stating that “a person whose mental condition 
is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of 
the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in 
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”69 Drope built on 
Dusky by specifically mentioning the ability to assist in preparation of the 
defense.70
 
displayed strange, self-defeating behavior in court and believed his lawyer and the judge were part of a 
conspiracy; and (3) the defendant had been hospitalized for multiple mental disorders, had likely 
undergone treatment with antipsychotic medication, and his attorney had repeatedly requested assistance 
from mental health professionals. See, e.g., United States v. Nichelson, 550 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Torres v. Prunty, 233 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 These cases remain the guideposts for evaluating competency to 
stand trial. Scholars such as Richard Bonnie have expounded on the 
Court’s terse competence standard by identifying in more detail the 
abilities needed to assist counsel, such as the ability to appreciate the 
seriousness of the situation and “recognize and relate relevant information 
 64. William H. Fisher et al., From Case Management To Court Clinic: Examining Forensic System 
Involvement of Persons With Severe Mental Illness, 2 Mental Health Services Res. 41 (2000). 
 65. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 361 (1996) (rejecting Oklahoma’s “clear and convincing” 
standard for establishing incompetency as offensive to “a principle of justice that is deeply ‘rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people’”). 
 66. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) (per curiam). 
 67. Id.; Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.  
 68. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. 
 70. Requiring competence to assist counsel protects both the dignity of the process and the 
reliability of the adjudication. See Bonnie, supra note 58, at 554–55. 
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to the attorney.”71 Bonnie and others have also emphasized the 
defendant’s decisionmaking capacity, focusing on the “capacity for 
reasoned choices.”72
2. Heightened Competence for Self-Representation 
 
Separate from the issue of competence to stand trial is the question 
of what level of competence a defendant must have to conduct her own 
defense.73 The Supreme Court only recently addressed this issue in 
Indiana v. Edwards.74 After the trial court found Edwards competent to 
stand trial but incompetent to represent himself, Edwards argued on 
appeal that his right to self-representation had been violated.75 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “the Constitution 
permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those 
competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from 
severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to 
conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”76 In reaching the conclusion 
that states may create a heightened standard of competency for self-
representation, the Court emphasized both the accuracy of the 
adjudication and the importance of safeguarding dignity.77
 
 71. Id. at 562–63. 
 The Court 
recognized that the lack of mental capacity “threatens an improper 
 72. See id. at 579; see also Terry A. Moroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” 
and the Criminal Defendant, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1375, 1376 (2006) (“A robust conception of 
adjudicative competence that gives meaning to the Dusky standard must ask whether a criminal 
defendant has the capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions potentially required of 
her, and a sound assessment of such capacity requires careful attention to both the cognitive and 
emotional influences on rational decision-making.”); see generally Joanmarie Ilaria Dasvoli, Physically 
Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. Louisville L. Rev. 313 (2009). 
 73. This question is particularly relevant when considering the appropriate competency standard 
for removal proceedings where counsel is a “privilege” rather than a right; persons in removal 
proceedings may hire attorneys at their own expense, but will not be provided attorneys. 
Consequently, sixty percent of the respondents in removal proceedings before the immigration courts 
are pro se, with significantly higher rates of pro se respondents in certain geographical areas and 
among detained populations. 
 74. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). Long before Edwards, and even before Dusky, 
however, the Court addressed the relationship between mental competency and representation by 
counsel in Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954), which powerfully stated that “[n]o trial can be 
fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his 
mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court.” 
 75. In making this argument, Edwards cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta v. California, 
which recognized that a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to proceed without counsel 
when” he “voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) 
(emphasis added). Because the defendant in that case was “literate, competent, and understanding,” 
the decision never addressed the impact of mental competency on the right to self-representation. Id. 
at 834–35 n.46. Yet Faretta did indicate that the right to self-representation is not absolute, noting that 
a pro se defendant had no right “to abuse the dignity of the courtroom” or to “engag[e] in serious and 
obstructionist misconduct.” Id. 
 76. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. 
 77. Id. at 176–77. 
MAROUF_19 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:54 AM 
May 2014]      INCOMPETENT BUT DEPORTABLE 945 
conviction or sentence” and therefore “undercuts the most basic of the 
Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.”78 In 
addition, the Court expressed concern about the humiliating “spectacle 
that could well result from [a defendant’s] self-representation at trial,”79 
stressing that the “proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear 
fair to all who observe them.”80
While Edwards stopped short of defining the heightened standard of 
competence, it did mention some conditions that could obstruct self-
representation, such as “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining 
attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and 
other common symptoms of severe mental illness.”
 
81 Some scholars have 
criticized Edwards for its vagueness and deference to judicial discretion, 
while others have attempted to identify the abilities necessary for self-
representation more concretely.82 Despite its shortcomings, Edwards 
remains highly relevant to considering the appropriate competence 
standard for removal proceedings where counsel is a privilege rather 
than a right. Persons in removal proceedings may hire attorneys at their 
own expense but are not appointed attorneys by the government.83 
Consequently, about half of the respondents in removal proceedings are 
pro se, with significantly higher rates of pro se respondents in certain 
geographical areas and among detained populations.84
 
 78. Id. 
 Edwards indicates 
 79. Id. at 176. 
 80. Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 
(1988)). 
 81. Id. at 176 (quoting Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, at 26, Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546, at *26) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Court in Edwards declined to adopt Indiana’s proposed standard, which would 
have “den[ied] a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot 
communicate coherently with the court or a jury.” Id. at 178 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 20, Edwards, 
554 U.S. 164 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 33606, at *20). 
 82. For critiques of Edwards, see, e.g., Conor P. Cleary, Note, Flouting Faretta: The Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Adopt a Coherent Communication Standard of Competency and the Threat to Self-
Representation After Indiana v. Edwards, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 145 (2010); Alexander B. Feinberg, Casenote: 
Constitutional Law—Competency and Self-representation—Constitution Permits States to Limit a 
Defendant’s Self-representation Right by Insisting Upon Representation by Counsel for Defendant Lacking 
Mental Competency, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 567, 579 (2009). For scholarship that proposes standards for 
competence to engage in self-representation, see E. Lea Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining 
the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 523, 571 (2011) (drawing on 
problem-solving theory to identify the abilities necessary for self-representation). 
 83. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented, 
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in 
such proceedings.”). 
 84. See Office of Planning, Analysis & Tech., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, FY 2012 Statistical Year Book at G1 (2013) (stating that the percentage of 
represented aliens increased from 45% in fiscal year (“FY”) 2008 to 56% in FY 2012); Peter L. 
Markowitz et al., Study Group on Immigration Representation, Accessing Justice: The Availability and 
Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 364 (2011) (finding that 
detainees were represented 40% of the time in New York City, 19% of the time in other parts of New 
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that it would be appropriate to require a higher standard of mental 
competency for these pro se individuals. As discussed in Part III, the only 
published decision on mental competence by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) has the opposite effect of imposing a lower standard of 
competence for unrepresented respondents.85
3. Consequences of a Finding of Incompetence 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana, an 
incompetent defendant could be detained indefinitely until competency 
was restored. In Jackson, the Court held that an incompetent “defendant 
cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to 
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain 
that competency in the foreseeable future.”86 Under the current federal 
statute, once an incompetent defendant has been committed for four 
months, a determination must be made about whether there is a 
“substantial probability” that the defendant can be restored to 
competence.87 Absent that showing, the state must either initiate civil 
commitment proceedings or release the defendant.88 In some situations, 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is allowed to help 
restore competence.89 As a practical matter, Jackson has led to more 
“marginally competent” defendants being declared restored and pushed 
into the courtroom.90
 
York, and 22% of the time in Newark, New Jersey); see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 
122 Yale L.J. 2282 (2013) (exploring how a future immigration defense system should be designed). 
 The increase in “marginally competent” defendants 
underscores the importance of recognizing a higher standard of 
competence for self-representation. In the criminal context, where most 
defendants are represented, this may not be a pressing concern, but in 
 85. The BIA does not require unrepresented individuals to have the ability to assist counsel with 
their defense, dropping a key part of the Dusky/Drope standard. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 
479 (B.I.A. 2011) (finding the proper test for competence in removal proceedings to be whether the 
respondent “has a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can 
consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine 
and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.” (emphasis added)). 
 86. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2012). 
 88. Id. § 4246. 
 89. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution permits 
the Government to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing 
serious criminal charges to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is 
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of 
the trial and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is significantly necessary to further important 
governmental trial-related interests.” Id. at 179. 
 90. J. Amy Dillard, Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The Search for Moral Dignity in the 
Court’s Competency Doctrine As Applied in Capital Cases, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 482–84 (2012) 
(arguing that courts and hospitals pushed more marginally competent defendants into court in 
response to Jackson). 
MAROUF_19 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:54 AM 
May 2014]      INCOMPETENT BUT DEPORTABLE 947 
the removal context, it becomes urgent to address the situation of 
marginally competent, unrepresented individuals. 
B. Competence in Civil Proceedings 
The Supreme Court has never recognized a substantive due process 
right to competence in civil proceedings, but courts must still provide 
procedural due process, which guarantees “the opportunity to be heard at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”91 The precise contours of 
procedural due process depend on the particular circumstances of the 
case and require consideration of the three factors set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge: “(1) the nature of the private 
interest that will be affected, (2) the comparative risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of that interest with and without additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards, and (3) the nature and magnitude of any 
countervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute procedural 
requirements.”92 Where the “individual interests at stake . . . are both 
‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money,’” 
due process places a heightened burden of proof on the government.93
The flexible, fact-specific balancing test in Mathews is consistent with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), which gives judges broad discretion 
to decide how to protect the rights of an incompetent individual in civil 
 
Courts applying the Mathews test in different contexts have, not 
surprisingly, reached different conclusions about the procedures that 
should be provided to deal with questions regarding a litigant’s 
competency. 
 
 91. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 
552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–18 (2011) (applying the Mathews factors in the context 
of determining whether a civil contempt proceeding requires appointment of counsel) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Mathews balancing test was initially 
conceived to address due process claims in the context of administrative law in a case involving a 
challenge to the adequacy of procedures for terminating Social Security disability benefits. Mathews, 
424 U.S. at 323–26. Mathews has since become a general approach for testing whether certain 
procedures comply with due process in a variety of contexts. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 
444 (1992). For example, the Supreme Court has applied the Mathews to determine the standard of 
proof for termination of parental rights and for civil commitment to a mental hospital. See generally 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).  
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have also applied the Mathews test to competency issues arising in the 
removal context. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing the Mathews 
test in assessing whether a petitioner challenging her deportability had a right to a competency hearing). 
 93. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (citation omitted) (involving termination of parental 
rights); Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (concerning involuntary civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 
385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966) (involving deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) 
(concerning denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (concerning 
denaturalization); Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e cannot treat 
immigration proceedings like everyday civil proceedings . . . because . . . the liberty of an individual is 
at stake in deportation proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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proceedings. This rule provides for the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem or issuance of another appropriate order “to protect . . . [an] 
incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.’”94 Both the 
Mathews test and Rule 17(c) implicitly recognize that the interests at 
stake in a civil proceeding may vary over a significant range. At one end 
of the spectrum, in the most ordinary type of case, mere money is in 
dispute. Other civil proceedings may threaten more basic human needs, 
such as eviction from housing or denial of public benefits. Then there are 
civil proceedings with outcomes that encroach upon punishment, such as 
termination of parental rights, civil commitment, incarceration for civil 
contempt, juvenile delinquency adjudications, habeas proceedings, and 
removal proceedings. Commentators have long discussed the erosion of 
the civil-criminal distinction and raised questions about what 
constitutional protections should apply in punitive civil cases.95
 
 94. Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)) (holding 
that “if an incompetent person is unrepresented, the court should not enter a judgment which operates 
as a judgment on the merits without complying with Rule 17(c)”). In Krain, the court explained that 
when there is a substantial question about the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se, the 
court should conduct a hearing to determine competence and, if necessary, to appoint a guardian ad 
litem. Id. The Second Circuit has held that Rule 17(c) imposes no duty upon a district court to “inquire 
sua sponte into a pro se [litigant’s] mental competence, even when the judge observes behavior that 
may suggest mental incapacity.” Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1195 (2004). However, a district court would likely abuse its discretion if it 
failed to consider Rule 17(c) when “presented with evidence from an appropriate court of record or a 
relevant public agency indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent, or if the court 
received verifiable evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or 
has been treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or her legally incompetent.” Id. 
While the court was “mindful of the need to protect the rights of the mentally incompetent,” it also 
expressed concern about “the volume of pro se filings” and the “potential burden on court 
administration associated with conducting frequent inquiries into pro se litigants’ mental competency.” 
See id.; see also Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2012) (approving of the Ferrelli standard). 
 Quasi-
criminal proceedings raise particularly challenging questions about what 
procedures should be followed to assess competency and what to do if a 
party is found incompetent. 
 95. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 2, at 1797; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the 
Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875 (1991); 
Franklin E. Zimring, Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1901 
(1991); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 Va. L. Rev. 79 
(2008) (examining procedural protections in criminal prosecutions and high-stakes civil cases against 
large corporations); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 Cornell L Rev. 239, 241–42 (2009); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: 
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775, 778–89 (1997); Mary 
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: 
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325 (1991) 
(recommending greater procedural protections for punitive civil sanctions); Jonathan I. Charney, The 
Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 478 
(1974); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional 
Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379 (1976). 
MAROUF_19 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:54 AM 
May 2014]      INCOMPETENT BUT DEPORTABLE 949 
Given the complexity of these issues, it is not surprising that courts 
frequently disagree about what process is due even when considering the 
same type of high stakes case. For example, in termination of parental 
rights cases, which threaten a “unique kind of deprivation”96 and bear 
“many of the indicia of a criminal trial,”97 state courts are split about 
whether the Mathews test requires a competency hearing prior to 
terminating the parent’s rights, which the Supreme Court has described 
as “a penalty as great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty.”98 The 
Connecticut Supreme Court has held that due process requires a 
competency hearing in this situation.99 Yet courts in several other states 
have reached the opposite conclusion after weighing the Mathews 
factors.100
Similarly, state courts are split about whether due process requires a 





 96. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham 
Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
 Applying the Mathews test, the California and 
 97. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762. 
 98. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 n.5. 
 99. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that due process requires a competency hearing prior to 
termination of parental rights “when (1) the parent’s attorney requests such a hearing, or (2) in the 
absence of such a request, the conduct of the parent reasonably suggests to the court, in the exercise of 
its discretion, the desirability of ordering such a hearing sua sponte.” In re Alexander V., 613 A.2d 780, 
785 (Conn. 1992). The standard in both situations is “whether the record before the court contains 
specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see In re Kaleb H., 48 A.3d 631, 636–39 
(Conn. 2012) (applying the standard in In re Alexander V. and holding that a competency hearing was 
not required because the record did not contain specific factors that, if true, would constitute 
substantial evidence of a mental impairment that would impede the respondent’s ability to understand 
the proceedings against her and assist counsel in her defense). 
 100. See, e.g., In re R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d 12, 19–22 (Tex. App. 2011) (discussing each of the three 
factors in the Mathews test, emphasizing the best interests of the child as a “trump card,” and 
concluding that due process did not require a competency hearing prior to terminating parental 
rights); In re N.S.E., 666 S.E.2d 587, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“We find no authority, and the father 
has cited none, requiring a Georgia court to order a competency hearing in a termination 
proceeding.”); In re W.J.S.M., 231 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“To require that a parent 
must be ‘competent’ before a court could terminate their parental rights ignores the rights of the child 
to permanency. The basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights was substantially based on the fact 
that Mother suffers from a mental condition which is permanent and renders her unable to provide the 
child with the necessary care, custody and control.”); People v. Wanda (In re Charles A.), 856 N.E.2d 
569, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (applying the Mathews factors and reasoning that termination of parental 
rights cases must be resolved expeditiously because postponing the case for a fitness hearing or for 
restoration of competency would adversely impact a child’s interest in finding a permanent home, as 
well as impose an increased fiscal cost and administrative burden on the state). 
 101. Compare Moore v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 530, 547 (Cal. 2010) (“[W]e conclude that due 
process does not require mental competence on the part of someone undergoing a commitment or 
recommitment trial under the [SVP Act].”), and Commonwealth v. Nieves, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Mass. 
2006) (“We see no reason why the public interest in committing sexually dangerous persons to the care 
of the treatment center must be thwarted by the fact that one who is sexually dangerous also happens 
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Massachusetts Supreme Courts found no due process right to a 
competency determination in such proceedings.102 These courts gave 
substantial weight to the government’s interest in public safety and 
reasoned that the right to appointed counsel in this type of proceeding is 
sufficient to protect the respondent’s interest.103 A Florida appellate court, 
on the other hand, found that the person must be competent in order to 
exercise her due process right to challenge the factual assertions contained 
in documents, including expert opinions.104 Otherwise, the court reasoned, 
“the due process right is simply illusory,” because “it is an incompetent 
respondent’s inability to assist counsel in challenging the facts contained 
in those hearsay statements that violates due process.”105
This Subpart examines the rights of incompetent individuals in two 
types of quasi-criminal civil proceedings as relevant background for the 
discussion of removal proceedings that follows. First, juvenile 
adjudications provide a clear example of a civil proceeding where the 
right to competence has been widely recognized. Exploring the reasoning 
of state courts helps clarify in which other contexts this right should also 
apply. Juvenile adjudications are then contrasted with capital habeas 
proceedings, which have none of the trappings of a criminal trial and 
require far less, if any, participation by the petitioner. These critical 
differences in the nature of the two proceedings help explain why the 
Supreme Court recently concluded that there is no right to competence 
in capital habeas proceedings.
 The reasoning 
of the Florida court highlights the interdependence of rights, especially 
the relationship between competency and the right to counsel, which we 
shall see again in the discussion of juvenile adjudications below. 
106
1. Mental Competence in Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications 
 As will be shown in Part III, removal 
proceedings resemble juvenile adjudications, rather than habeas 
proceedings. 
Juvenile delinquency adjudications are technically civil but so 
closely approximate criminal trials that juveniles benefit from many of 
the same rights as criminal defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
held, for example, that juveniles are entitled to appointed counsel, 
formal notice, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the 
 
to be incompetent.”), with Branch v. State (In re Commitment of Branch), 890 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing a limited right to a competency determination). 
 102. See Moore, 237 P.3d at 547; Nieves, 846 N.E.2d at 385. 
 103. See Nieves, 846 N.E.2d at 385; see also John L. Schwab, Due Process and “The Worst of the 
Worst”: Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 112 Colum. 
L. Rev. 912, 945 (2012). 
 104. In re Commitment of Branch, 890 So. 2d at 327. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700 (2013). 
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privilege against self-incrimination.107 Moreover, each element in a 
juvenile adjudication must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt—the 
same standard used for a criminal conviction.108 Yet some important 
differences remain between juvenile adjudications and criminal trials: 
juveniles do not have the right to a trial by jury, the right to bail, or the 
right to a public trial.109
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a 
juvenile must be competent to be adjudicated, the majority of states have 
now addressed this issue. At least thirty-four states and the District of 
Columbia have recognized a right to competence in juvenile adjudications, 




 107. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31–57 (1967). 
 Three main 
lines of reasoning can be derived from these state court decisions: (1) a 
substantive right to competence emerges because no amount of procedure 
is sufficient to ensure a fair and accurate proceeding; (2) a right to 
competence is a precondition for exercising other established rights; and 
(3) juvenile adjudications have many of the trappings of a criminal trial, so 
 108. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 109. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–551 (1971) (holding that the right to 
jury trial is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings); United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (“We have not extended the ‘public trial’ right to juvenile defendants. In McKeiver, the 
Supreme Court seemed to express disdain for the idea.”); State ex rel. P.M.P., 975 A.2d 441, 446 (N.J. 
2009) (“[E]xcept for the right to indictment, the right to a jury trial, and the right to bail, [a]ll rights 
guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
this State . . . [are] applicable to cases arising under [the juvenile code]” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 110. Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile 
Court, 9 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 353, 372, 379 (2001). Among the states that rely on statutes, some have 
a single statutory scheme that applies to both juvenile adjudications and criminal trials for adults, 
while others have separate statutes that specifically address juvenile competency. See Sue Burrell, et 
al., Incompetent Youth in California Juvenile Justice, 19 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 198, 213 (2008). State 
courts that have found a constitutional right to competence in juvenile proceedings include Arizona, 
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Vermont, Washington, D.C. See In re 
Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1979) (finding the right not to be tried or convicted 
while incompetent to be a “fundamental right,” even in the context of a juvenile delinquency 
adjudicatory proceeding); State ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. 1978) (finding a “fundamental 
due process right” to competence in juvenile adjudications); In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C. 
1990) (“The right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent is a fundamental right of a juvenile in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings”); State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 619 P.2d 12 (Ariz. 1980) 
(en banc); People v. Carey (In re Carey), 615 N.W.2d 742, 746–47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding 
that “the right not to be tried while incompetent is as fundamental in juvenile proceedings as it is in 
the criminal context”); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (“Principles of fundamental 
fairness require that this right [not to be subjected to a trial while incompetent] be afforded in juvenile 
proceedings.”); People v. T.D.W. (In re T.D.W.), 441 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), overruled on 
other grounds by People v. Gentry, 815 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 
510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “‘the right not to be tried while incompetent’ is as fundamental 
in juvenile proceedings as it is in criminal trials of adults”); In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001) 
(“Although juveniles are not necessarily entitled to every procedural protection afforded criminal 
defendants . . . an incompetent juvenile cannot be found delinquent without violating our basic 
concepts of due process of law.”). 
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proceeding with an incompetent juvenile would threaten the dignity of 
the legal process.111
The first line of reasoning indicates that a substantive due process 
right to competence emerges when no amount of process can ensure a 
fair and accurate proceeding. The most explicit example of this reasoning 
is a decision by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which 
observed that the “first function served by the adult competency 
requirement and the Dusky standard is to assure that the person charged 
with violating the law is able to prepare a defense, in order to increase 
the accuracy of the factual and guilt determinations.”
 These arguments overlap substantially with the 
rationales behind prohibiting the trial of incompetent defendants. 
112 The court then 
found that this function “cannot be fulfilled by procedures other than a 
Dusky type standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings.”113 In other 
words, a substantive right to competence emerges because no amount of 
procedure can ensure the fair adjudication of an incompetent individual. 
Other courts likewise connect a right to competence in juvenile 
proceedings to fundamental fairness, but do so without explicitly 
explaining the move from procedural to substantive due process.114
The notion that procedural rights can give birth to a substantive 
right is neither radical nor new. As Justice John. M. Harlan observed in 
his concurrence in In re Gault, “[p]rocedure at once reflects and creates 
substantive rights, and every effort of courts since the beginnings of the 
common law to separate the two has proved essentially futile.”
 
115 In a 
dissenting opinion in Albright v. Oliver, Justice Stevens, in a dissenting 
opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, similarly stressed that “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment contains only one Due Process Clause,” and 
“[t]hough it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of doctrine, to distinguish 
between substantive and procedural due process, the two concepts are 
not mutually exclusive, and their protections often overlap.”116
 
 111. See infra notes 
 Federal 
appellate courts have also recognized that “sometimes there is overlap” 
127–142 and accompanying text. 
 112. In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d at 1267. 
 113. Id. at 1267 n.7 (emphasis added). 
 114. See, e.g., In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 811 (“Principles of fundamental fairness require that this 
right [not to be subjected to a trial] be afforded in juvenile proceedings.”); State ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 
2d at 476 (blurring the line between substantive and procedural due process by finding that “the right 
not to be tried while incompetent is a due process-fundamental fairness right” that should be 
“applicable to juvenile proceedings”). 
 115. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 301 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment contains only one Due Process Clause. Though it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of 
doctrine, to distinguish between substantive and procedural due process . . . the two concepts are not 
mutually exclusive, and their protections often overlap.”); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Competency claims are based either upon substantive due process or procedural 
due process, although sometimes there is overlap.”). 
 116. Albright, 510 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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between substantive and procedural due process in the context of 
competency claims.117
The second line of reasoning regarding competence as a precondition 
for exercising other rights is exemplified by the decision of a Georgia 
appellate court, which found that a twelve-year-old boy with the mental 
age of a six-year-old and an IQ of forty was incompetent to stand 
delinquency proceedings for aggravated sodomy.
 Thus, it may be helpful to think of a substantive right 
to competence as the end point on a spectrum of procedural protections 
when nothing short of such protections will suffice. 
118 Noting that In re Gault 
confirmed the rights of juveniles to adequate notice of the charges, 
appointment of counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the 
right to confront opposing witnesses, the court reasoned that “the 
cornerstone of these substantive rights is competence to understand the 
nature of the charges and assist in a defense.”119 In other words, a “want 
of competence renders the other rights meaningless.”120
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main 
part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right 
to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, 
and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own 
behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.
 This view of the 
right to competence as a precondition for the exercise of other rights 
echoes Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins v. Nevada, 
which explained:  
121
While the Georgia decision considered the collective body of rights 
recognized by the Supreme Court in juvenile proceedings, some other 
states have placed special emphasis on the right to counsel. For instance, 
in reviewing a case involving two juveniles who had committed delinquent 
acts, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that as “a matter of constitutional 
law, the trial court could go no further with the proceedings” where 
“neither minor could competently assist legal counsel in preparing 
defenses to the delinquency charges.”
 
122 The court reasoned, “the right to 
counsel is meaningless unless that right is interpreted to mean effective 
counsel and counsel cannot be effective, particularly with reference to 
the merits of a case, without the competent cooperation of his client.”123
 
 117. Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1133 (“Competency claims are based either upon substantive due process 
or procedural due process, although sometimes there is overlap.”). 
 
 118. In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 812. 
 119. Id. at 812 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13). 
 120. Id. (citation omitted). 
 121. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted); see also People v. Carey (In re Carey), 615 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1997) (“Competency is an underlying predicate to due process.”) (quoting Lagway v. Dallman, 
806 F. Supp. 1322, 1333 (N.D. Ohio 1992)). 
 122. In re Two Minor Children, 592 P.2d 166, 169 (Nev. 1979). 
 123. Id. (citation omitted). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona has held that “the right to 
assistance of counsel would be meaningless if the juvenile, through 
mental illness, was unable to understand the charges or assist in her own 
defense.”124
Finally, the third line of reasoning emphasizes the nature of the 
proceedings in extending the right to competence from criminal trials to 
juvenile adjudications. The implicit rationale is that if the proceedings 
have the trappings of a criminal trial, then the legal dignity of the process 
is threatened if the court proceeds with an incompetent individual. As 
the Michigan Court of Appeals explained: 
 
Even though . . . juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial, 
they have many of the trappings of criminal proceedings; the petition is 
filed by the prosecutor, notice is required, there must be a preliminary 
hearing, which resembles an arraignment in criminal proceedings, and 
the functions of the prosecutor and court are the equivalent to their 
functions in a criminal proceeding.125
By looking beyond the technical label of “civil” to the actual nature of 
the proceedings, the Michigan court followed In re Gault, which turned 
on the “reality” of juvenile proceedings.
 
126 In fact, the Michigan court’s 
decision reflects the view expressed by some U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices that the proper inquiry is whether, “by our prior cases and by 
common sense,” a particular substantive due process claim is “close 
enough to the interests that we already have protected to be deemed an 
aspect of ‘liberty’ as well.”127





 124. See State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 619 P.2d 12, 15 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc) (recognizing 
that “[i]n the context of a juvenile delinquency adjudicatory proceeding, the right not to be tried or 
convicted while incompetent has been held to be a fundamental right”); see also In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d 
at 746 (stressing that the right to counsel “means little if the juvenile is unaware of the proceedings or 
unable to communicate with counsel because of a psychological or developmental disability”). 
 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
reasoned that “the nature of juvenile proceedings themselves, being 
specifically not criminal proceedings and being directed towards 
rehabilitation of a juvenile, indicates . . . the intent of the legislature to 
 125. Id. at 746. 
 126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (powerfully describing the reality of what is at stake in a 
juvenile proceeding). 
 127. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that 
substantive due process is about underlying values, rather than “blind imitation of the past”); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 573 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “[h]istory 
and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process 
inquiry” and arguing that courts may adopt a more expansive view of substantive due process based on 
an “emerging awareness” of modern practices) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Redding & Frost, supra note 110, at 368. 
MAROUF_19 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:54 AM 
May 2014]      INCOMPETENT BUT DEPORTABLE 955 
deal with juveniles regardless of mental state.”129 As one article points 
out, this decision was made in 1989, before juvenile justice systems had 
fully transitioned from being rehabilitative to truly penal in nature.130 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court may therefore reach a different conclusion if 
it were asked to address this issue today.131
This brief review shows widespread consensus that juveniles have a 
right to competence in civil delinquency adjudications. Although states 
remain divided on other important aspects of the competency 
determination for juveniles, including the definition of competence
 
132 and 
the result of an incompetency finding,133
C. Mental Competence in Capital Habeas Proceedings 
 the core right to competence is 
well established through statutes and case law. The three strands of 
reasoning in the decisions discussed above clearly resonate with the core 
rationale underlying the prohibition against trial of incompetent 
individuals and provide a roadmap for asserting a substantive due 
process right to competence in removal proceedings, as discussed further 
in Part IV. 
Habeas proceedings, like juvenile adjudications, are quasi-criminal in 
nature, although for different reasons. A juvenile adjudication resembles a 
criminal trial, whereas a habeas proceeding is “[r]ealistically . . . a stage in 
the criminal process.”134 As one federal appellate court observed, “to the 
extent that a habeas proceeding reviews a criminal punishment with the 
potential of overturning it, the habeas proceeding necessarily assumes 
part of the underlying case’s criminal nature.”135
 
 129. G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). 
 The backward-looking 
nature of habeas proceedings was central to the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous opinion in the consolidated cases of Ryan v. Gonzales and 
 130. Redding & Frost, supra note 110, at 373. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Some states apply the definition of competence set forth in Dusky and Drope, while others 
impose a more restrictive standard for juveniles. Id. at 369–70. Wyoming, for example, requires not 
only the presence of mental illness or mental retardation, but also that the juvenile satisfy the criteria 
for involuntary civil commitment, which requires the individual to be unable to present a danger to 
others or be unable to care for herself. Id. at 370 (citing Wyo. St. Ann. § 14-6-218(c) (2001)). 
 133. Some statutes provide for dismissal of the charges, while others call for civil commitment of 
the juvenile or list a range of options that may include “dismissal, probation, commitment, or filing a 
child in needs of services petition.” Id. at 371 (citation omitted). Other differences pertain to the 
number of competency evaluations and who may perform them, as well as to the provisions, if any, 
addressing restoration to competence. Id. at 370–74. 
 134. See Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423–24 
(1963) (clarifying that a habeas proceeding is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact 
considered to be civil in nature), overruled in part by Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 135. See O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527, 
542 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In rare circumstances, a habeas court can end a state criminal proceeding as part 
of the habeas remedy.”). 
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Tibbals v. Carter, issued in January 2013, which held that the 
incompetence of a state prisoner on death row does not require 
suspension of his federal habeas proceeding.136
In Ryan, which reversed a Ninth Circuit decision deriving a right to 
competence from a statute providing a right to counsel in capital habeas 
proceedings, the Court explained that “[g]iven the backward-looking, 
record-based nature of most federal habeas proceedings, counsel can 
generally provide effective representation to a habeas petitioner regardless 
of the petitioner’s competence.”
 
137 The Court found that attorneys “are 
quite capable of reviewing the state-court record, identifying legal errors, 
and marshaling relevant arguments, even without their clients’ 
assistance.”138 Ryan is therefore not applicable to other contexts that are 
closer to trials, such as juvenile adjudications or removal proceedings, 
where the incompetent individual would need to play a much more 
active role in developing the facts and communicating with counsel. 
Indeed, the Court explicitly acknowledged in Ryan “that the benefits 
flowing from the right to counsel at trial could be affected if an 
incompetent defendant is unable to communicate with his attorney.”139 As 
an example, the Court observed that an incompetent individual “would be 
unable to assist counsel in identifying witnesses and deciding on a trial 
strategy.”140
The Court’s description of habeas proceedings in Ryan shows that 
the reasons behind the prohibition against trying incompetent defendants 
 
 
 136. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700, 707 (2013) (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in 
deriving a right to competence from the statutory right to counsel in capital habeas proceedings in 
18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2013) and that the Sixth Circuit erred in basing a right to competence on 
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) because that statute applies only to federal defendants, not state prisoners, and is 
limited to proceedings prior to sentencing and after probation, which do not encompass habeas 
proceedings). As a practical matter, the issue of competence usually only arises in habeas proceedings 
when the death penalty is involved because a habeas petitioner in a non-capital case has no incentive 
to delay or halt the proceedings with a finding of incompetence. See, e.g., Holmes, 506 F.3d at 578–79 
(explaining that a habeas petitioner in a non-capital case “usually has little to gain by claiming that he 
is incompetent to conduct the postconviction proceeding or, if he has the assistance of a lawyer, to 
assist in the lawyer’s conduct of the proceeding,” because a finding of incompetence would simply halt 
the proceeding and result in the petitioner “languish[ing] in prison”). If the petitioner is facing the 
death penalty, however, he “may prefer to languish in prison than to see his claims for postconviction 
relief denied, opening the way to his execution.” Id. 
 137. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 704. The Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion in Ryan based on two prior 
precedents. In Rohan, the court had held that a federal statute guaranteeing state capital prisoners a right 
to counsel in federal habeas proceedings could not “be faithfully enforced unless courts ensure that a 
petitioner is competent.” Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by 
Ryan, 133 S. Ct. 696. The Ninth Circuit then extended the right to competence to record-based appeals, 
explaining that even in this situation, a petitioner is not “relegated to a nonexistent role,” as “[m]eaningful 
assistance of appellate counsel may require rational communication between counsel and a habeas 
petitioner.” Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Ryan, 133 S. Ct. 696. 
 138. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 705. 
 139. Id. at 703. 
 140. Id.  
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do not apply to the habeas context. Not only does the backward-looking 
nature of habeas result in the petitioner playing a different role with 
counsel, but it also means that many of the other rights that require 
competence are simply not applicable to habeas. For example, the rights 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to testify on one’s own behalf 
have no relevance to habeas proceedings. Consequently, proceeding with 
an incompetent petitioner does not give rise to the same concerns about 
jeopardizing the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings or compromising 
other constitutional rights. Furthermore, since most habeas writs are 
decided without any court hearing at all, moving forward with an 
incompetent petitioner cannot be analogized to an in absentia trial. 
Finally, the incompetence of a habeas petitioner does not pose the 
same threat to the moral dignity of the legal process as the incompetence 
of a criminal defendant or juvenile because no “prosecution” is taking 
place that requires meaningful moral understanding of wrongdoing and 
punishment. Habeas is an action brought by the petitioner against the 
warden of the state prison, not a proceeding against the petitioner.141 A 
habeas petitioner collaterally attacks a conviction that occurred at an 
earlier state trial; she does not mount a defense.142 The state court has 
already entered “a presumptively valid judgment,” and the petitioner 
must have been competent at that time to be convicted.143
In short, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ryan leaves completely 
open the question of whether a right to competence might exist in a 
different type of quasi-criminal context that more closely resembles a 
trial. Removal proceedings, where trial attorneys engage in active 
prosecution and testimony plays a crucial role, have no resemblance to 
habeas proceedings and require a very different analysis. 
 Thus, the 
phase for concern about moral understanding of wrongdoing has passed. 
III.  Mental Competence in Quasi-Criminal Removal Proceedings 
Removal proceedings, like juvenile adjudications, are technically 
civil but courts and commentators alike have recognized their quasi-
criminal nature.144
 
 141. Id. at 707. 
 The Supreme Court acknowledged over half a century 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 709. 
 144. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal 
Divide, supra note 3, at 290–91 (distinguishing exclusion from expulsion, and arguing that “the 
determination of whether to expel a noncitizen whom the government has previously invited into the 
national community as a lawful permanent resident is a criminal proceeding, in which the defendant is 
entitled to the full panoply of criminal procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution”); 
Markowitz, Deportation is Different, supra note 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Padilla represents an important departure from precedents that treat deportation proceedings as 
purely civil); Eagly, supra note 9 (describing how immigration enforcement and criminal processes are 
intertwined). 
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ago that deportation can be a more severe penalty than criminal 
punishment because it “may result in poverty, persecution and even 
death”145 or “of all that makes life worth living.”146 More recently, in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court acknowledged “the seriousness of 
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea,” and held that an 
attorney’s failure to advise defendants about the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions may constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel and violate the Sixth Amendment.147
Almost every aspect of removal proceedings more closely resembles 
a criminal proceeding than a civil one. ICE normally initiates the process 
by issuing a warrant for the noncitizen’s arrest and filing a charging 
document called the “Notice to Appear” with the immigration court.
 
148 
At the first hearing, the respondent usually admits or denies the charges, 
which is similar to an arraignment.149 A trial attorney with DHS plays the 
role of “prosecutor” and has the burden of establishing removability by 
“clear and convincing” evidence, a standard that is higher than the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard used in most civil cases.150
Once removability is established, the immigrant has the right to file 
various applications for relief from removal and carries the burden of 
establishing eligibility for those forms of relief, similar to presenting 
affirmative defenses in a criminal case.
 
151 The Immigration Judge 
schedules a “merits” hearing that resembles a mini-trial on these 
applications.152 Unlike criminal trials, however, the immigrant is often 
unrepresented, normally testifies, and is subject to vigorous cross-
examination by the trial attorney.153 Lay and expert witnesses may also 
be called and cross-examined.154 At the end of the merits hearing, the 
judge decides whether to grant relief or issue an order of removal.155 The 
judge’s decision may be appealed to the BIA, and the BIA’s decision 
may be appealed to the federal appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
state where the immigration court proceeding occurred.156





 145. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 136, 164 (1945). 
 In fact, immigration detainees—even those with no criminal 
 146. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
 147. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.  
 148. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2014). 
 149. Id. § 1240.10(c). 
 150. Id. § 1240.8(a). 
 151. Id. § 1240.8(d). 
 152. Id. §§ 1240.7, 1240.9, 1240.10. 
 153. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1240.9. 
 154. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). 
 155. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12. 
 156. Id. § 1240.15. 
 157. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a), (c)(1). 
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record—and inmates serving criminal sentences are frequently held 
together in the same facility.158 Detained noncitizens may request a bond 
hearing before the immigration judge, which is very similar to a bail 
hearing.159 However, large categories of immigrants are not eligible for 
release on bond and therefore remain detained for years while their 
cases are pending in immigration court or on appeal.160
This description shows that removal proceedings, like juvenile 
adjudications, have many of the trappings of criminal trials. Yet 
incompetent respondents facing deportation receive minimal protections. 
 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Pertaining to Mental 
Incompetence 
The INA and its regulations provide little guidance on how to treat 
incompetent individuals in removal proceedings. The sole statutory 
provision that addresses incompetency vaguely provides: “If it is 
impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the alien to 
be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall prescribe 
safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”161
The regulations likewise fail to protect the interests of incompetent 
noncitizens. Regarding service of process, the regulations actually make 
it easier to deport incompetent individuals who are confined to an 
institution or hospital by disposing of the requirement that they be 
served personally and permitting service on the person in charge of the 
facility to suffice.
 As discussed 
further below, any immigrant who lacks competence is arguably not 
“present” in the proceedings, but the usefulness of this provision is 




 158. In FY 2013, nearly seventy percent of detained immigrants were held in one of 244 state and 
county jails contracted to house immigrant detainees on behalf of ICE. See Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Salaries and Expenses, Fiscal Years 2012–
2014 Congressional Budget Justification 44 (2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/MGMT/DHS-%20Annual%20Performance%20Report%20and%20Congressional-
Budget-Justification-FY2014.pdf. 
 For incompetent individuals who are not confined, 
 159. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a)–(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1. 
 160. Several categories of noncitizens are not eligible for bond hearings in immigration court, 
including: those subject to mandatory detention under the INA: “arriving aliens” (those who showed 
up at a point of entry and asked for admission to the United States, including asylum-seekers); and 
immigrants placed in “asylum only” proceedings. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (concerning 
mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens); INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (concerning arriving 
aliens). 
 161. INA § 240a(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3). 
 162. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii). The BIA recently held that when there are indicia of a 
respondent’s mental incompetency, DHS should serve the notice to appear on three individuals: (1) a 
person with whom the respondent resides, who, when the respondent is detained in a penal or mental 
institution, will be someone in a position of demonstrated authority in the institution or his or her 
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the regulation allows service on any person with whom an incompetent 
person resides, without consideration of whether that person is competent 
herself or has the best interests of the respondent at heart.163
Moreover, far from requiring appointment of counsel, or even a 
guardian ad litem for an incompetent respondent, the regulation provides 
that any “guardian, near relative, or friend” may appear on behalf of a 
respondent when it is “impracticable for the respondent to be present at 
the hearing because of mental incompetency.”
 
164 Thus, an incompetent 
respondent facing deportation receives less protection than civil litigants 
receive in federal court because the federal rule provides that the “court 
must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to 
protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an 
action.”165 The immigration regulation merely states that a guardian, near 
relative, or friend “shall be permitted to appear on behalf of the 
respondent,” which allows the immigration court to play a much more 
passive role.166
The regulations also provide no criteria for evaluating whether a 
given person is appropriate for the role of appearing on behalf of the 
incompetent respondent, such as whether the person is free of conflicts 
of interest, will represent the best interests of the respondent, or has any 
knowledge of the immigration system.
 
167 During interviews with Human 
Rights Watch, some advocates reported encountering legal guardians in 
immigration cases who “could not identify the interests or will of the 
client.”168 Even worse, the regulations specify that if a guardian, relative, 
or friend cannot be found or fails to appear, the immigration court may 
actually request “the custodian of the respondent” to appear on the 
respondent’s behalf.169
 
delegate and, when the respondent is not detained, will be a responsible party in the household, if 
available; (2) whenever applicable or possible, a relative, guardian, or person similarly close to the 
respondent; and (3) in most cases, the respondent. See In re E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 136 (B.I.A. 2013). 
Thus, while the BIA encouraged service on the respondent, it did not hold that this is always required. 
 This means that if ICE has detained the 
respondent, the very agency seeking to deport the respondent may appear 
 163. 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii). 
 164. Id. § 1240.4. 
 165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (emphasis added). 
 166. Cf. id. (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4. 
 167. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4. In litigation challenging these regulations, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) stressed that the regulations “allow a system to exist with lower standards for the 
representation of an incompetent individual, allowing untrained representatives with potential and 
unexamined conflicts of interest to waive non-citizens’ fundamental rights without their consent or 
even comprehension.” See First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relieve and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 30 ¶ 92, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-02211 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-8-2-GonzalezvHolder-
AmendedComplaint.pdf. 
 168. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 72 n.252. 
 169. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4 (emphasis added). 
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on her behalf. Despite the clear conflict of interest that this provision 
creates, courts have permitted detention center employees to represent 
respondents in removal proceedings.170 In order to be appointed a 
guardian ad litem, on the other hand, a person must, at a minimum, 
demonstrate independence and competence.171
In addition, the regulations explicitly allow an immigration judge to 
accept an admission of removability from an incompetent individual who 
lacks counsel as long as that individual is accompanied by a “near relative, 
legal guardian, or friend.”
 
172
B. Recent Developments Regarding Mental Incompetence 
 The question of whether or not someone is 
removable from the United States can be extremely complicated, both 
legally and factually. Allowing an unrepresented, incompetent individual 
to admit to removability simply because he or she appears in court with a 
“friend,” who may have absolutely no knowledge of the legal issues or 
the facts of the case, fails to safeguard the respondent’s interests. Since 
2011, recent developments have attempted to increase procedural due 
process protections for incompetent individuals facing deportation, but 
the idea of a substantive due process right to competence has neither 
been asserted nor addressed. 
1. Introduction of “Safeguards” Under In re M-A-M- 
In 2011, the BIA finally provided some framework for addressing 
questions of competency in removal proceedings.173 In re M-A-M- 
addressed when an immigration judge should make a competency 
determination, what factors a judge should consider and what procedures 
to follow to reach that determination, and the types of “safeguards” that 
may be prescribed when the respondent is found incompetent.174 First, 
the BIA found that “an alien is presumed to be competent to participate 
in removal proceedings,” so “[a]bsent indicia of mental incompetency, an 
Immigration Judge is under no obligation to analyze an alien’s 
competency.”175 This finding is consistent with the law regarding 
competency in criminal cases.176
 
 170. Tex. Appleseed, Justice for Immigration’s Hidden Population 51 (2010). 
 The BIA noted that indicia of 
 171. See, e.g., Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) gives the district court the power to “effectuate its appointment 
of a competent, independent guardian ad litem”). 
 172. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c). 
 173. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 474 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 174. Id. at 476. 
 175. Id. at 477. 
 176. See, e.g., Porter v. McKaskle, 466 U.S. 984, 985 (1984) (“It is settled that, if evidence available 
to a trial judge raises a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant’s ability to understand and participate in 
the proceedings against him, the judge has an obligation to order an examination to assess his 
competency, even if the defendant does not request such an exam.”). 
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incompetency could include “the inability to understand and respond to 
questions, the inability to stay on topic, or a high level of distraction,” as 
well as documentary evidence, such as assessments of the respondent’s 
mental health, testimony from professionals, and school records.177
Significantly, the BIA acknowledged that DHS is often in possession 
of relevant documents, especially when the respondent is detained, and 
found that “DHS has an obligation to provide the court with relevant 
materials in its possession that would inform the court about the 
respondent’s mental competency.”
 
178 This part of the holding is important 
because trial attorneys have not always submitted evidence of 
incompetence to the immigration court. Human Rights Watch has 
documented cases in which trial attorneys failed to inform the court that 
the respondent had a mental disability, as well as cases where they 
refused or neglected to supply information to the court, even when 
specifically ordered to do so.179 Interviews conducted with immigration 
judges and attorneys indicated that ICE trial attorneys often “resisted 
efforts . . . to accommodate non-citizens with mental disabilities by 
providing mental health evaluations, sharing medical records with the 
court or attorneys, or agreeing to terminate cases where the person in 
proceedings cannot participate or protect his or her rights.”180
In re M-A-M- does not require a competency hearing once questions 
of competency come to light. In fact, the decision does not even require a 
professional mental competency evaluation, much less one paid for by the 
government. Rather, the decision vaguely instructs immigration judges to 





 177. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479–80. Other evidence could include reports from teachers, 
counselors, or social workers; participation in programs for persons with mental illness; applications 
for disability benefits; and affidavits or testimony from friends or family members. Id. 
 Such measures may include simply asking 
questions to the respondent, granting continuances to allow the parties 
 178. Id. at 480. ICE attorneys are usually in the best position to obtain medical records in a prompt 
manner, as FOIA requests for a detainee’s medical records can take several months to process, 
making it difficult for an attorney to present timely evidence of incompetence. Moreover, detainees 
are frequently transferred between detention centers without their medical records. See Justice for 
Immigration’s Hidden Population, supra note 170, at 41 (“[E]ven when records exist and can be 
found, immigrants and their lawyers have difficulty accessing those records.”). 
 179. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 34, 48. For example, in one case before the Boston 
Immigration Court, the ICE attorney revealed that the respondent had been previously found 
incompetent in criminal court only after the judge remarked that the respondent appeared to have a 
mental disability. Id. at 34 (quoting Telephone Interview by Human Rights Watch with John Pollock, 
Nat’l Lawyers Guild (Dec. 7, 2009)) (discussing observations of immigration court proceedings in 
Boston, including a case witnessed on November 2003). In another case, an ICE attorney who 
repeatedly failed to produce the competency evaluation requested by the immigration judge told the 
court “there aren’t sufficient resources for us to do the evaluation.” Id. at 48 (quoting Telephone 
Interview, supra). 
 180. Id. at 49. 
 181. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480. 
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time to submit evidence regarding the respondent’s mental health, 
changing venue to allow a respondent to be closer to family or treatment 
programs, or requesting a mental competency evaluation.182 Judges are 
supposed to “weigh” the results from these measures to determine if the 
respondent is competent.183
The test for competency to participate in immigration proceedings is 
also deficient because the standard is whether the respondent “has a 
rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the 
proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative if there is 
one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses.”
 Thus, In re M-A-M- permits the procedure 
for determining competency to be completely ad hoc. 
184 Under this test, a significant part of the 
Dusky/Drope standard simply drops out of the analysis for respondents 
who are pro se, making it easier for them to be deemed competent than 
respondents with representation.185 This paradoxical result conflicts with 
Edwards, which recognized the appropriateness of applying a higher 
standard of competence for self-representation.186 Federal courts should 
reject the BIA’s definition of competence under the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance because it raises serious constitutional concerns 
under the due process clause.187 However, even if the BIA’s definition 
were treated as a statutory or regulatory interpretation that deserves 
deferential review, courts should reject it as unreasonable or plainly 
erroneous because it requires a lower standard of competence for pro se 
respondents than for those with counsel.188
If a respondent is found incompetent under the test in In re M-A-M-, 
then the result is not termination of the removal proceedings, but simply 
 
 
 182. Id. at 480–81. 
 183. Id. at 481. 
 184. Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
 185. See supra note 84. 
 186. In Edwards, the Court explained that the standards in Drope and Dusky “assume 
representation by counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 
164, 174 (2008). These standards “thus suggest (though do not hold) that an instance in which a 
defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial presents a very different set of circumstances, 
which in our view, calls for a different standard.” Id. at 174–75. 
 187. Agencies’ constitutional interpretations are not entitled to judicial deference. See, e.g., United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973). 
Indeed, “[i]t is . . . a ‘permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system’ that ‘the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.’” United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616–17 n.7 (2000) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922–23 (1995)). 
 188. An agency’s interpretation of its statute is normally reviewed under Chevron, which requires 
courts to defer to any reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). An agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation is reviewed under Seminole Rock, which requires deference unless the agency’s 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
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that the judge should employ so-called “safeguards.”189 The decision 
gives judges total discretion to decide what kind of safeguards would be 
appropriate.190 While the BIA gives some examples of safeguards, 
appointment of counsel is notably absent from that list.191 In fact, instead 
of requiring appointed counsel, the BIA suggests that the participation of 
a family member, friend, or guardian somehow serves as a safeguard.192 
The BIA also entrusts the judge to take on certain roles traditionally 
performed by counsel, such as “actively aiding in the development of the 
record, including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses” 
and “reserving appeal rights for the respondent.”193
Moreover, the BIA does not explain how the safeguards that it 
mentions would actually help provide a full and fair hearing to an 
incompetent individual. For example, continuances may be helpful in the 
short-term but are of little use if the respondent cannot afford counsel or 
additional medical treatment.
 In re M-A-M- 
therefore takes a very different approach than the recommendations set 
forth in this Article, which maintain that appointment of counsel is 
necessary for all individuals in removal proceedings who do not meet the 
heightened standard of competence necessary for self-representation. 
194 Other supposed safeguards noted in the 
decision, such as “closing the hearing to the public” and “waiving the 
respondent’s appearance,” may actually undermine rather than promote 
a fair hearing.195
2. The Franco-Gonzalez Litigation 
 Thus, while In re M-A-M- made important strides in 
requiring immigration judges to grapple with questions of competence, it 
set an unreasonably low standard of competence for unrepresented 
individuals and did not require competency hearings or appointed 
counsel, leaving much to the discretion of immigration judges. 
In 2010, before the In re M-A-M- decision, a coalition of legal 
organizations filed a class action lawsuit in a Los Angeles federal district 
court on behalf of immigrant detainees in California, Arizona, and 
 
 189. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 477–82. 
 190. Id. at 482–83. 
 191. Id. at 483. 
 192. Id.; cf. Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the Madness: The Right to 
Court Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings, 
16 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 1, 1 (2013) (arguing for concurrent appointment of both guardians ad 
litem and counsel for mentally ill individuals). 
 193. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483. 
 194. See id. at 483 (stating that safeguards may include “docketing or managing the case to 
facilitate the respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical treatment in an effort 
to restore competency,” as well as “continuance of the case for good cause shown”). 
 195. Id.  
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Washington with severe mental disabilities.196 The named plaintiffs had 
been diagnosed with mental disabilities ranging from schizophrenia to 
mental retardation, and several had been found incompetent to stand 
trial in other court proceedings.197 The lead plaintiff, Jose Antonio 
Franco-Gonzales, did not know his own age or birthday and could not 
tell time or dial phone numbers.198 An immigration judge had found him 
incompetent and administratively closed his case in 2005, but he 
continued to languish in immigration detention for almost five more 
years without a bond hearing.199 The lawsuit alleged violations under the 
INA, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act.200 The complaint alleged that mentally 
incompetent immigrant detainees should be appointed competent 
representation and that they should have a right to a bond hearing.201
After the class was certified, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment and a permanent injunction.
 
202 The district court’s 
order, issued in April 2013, broke new ground by embracing a disability 
rights framework for analyzing mentally incompetent individuals’ right to 
appointed counsel, relying on a theory of reasonable accommodation. 
The court held that appointment of counsel is required under section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, which forbids federally funded agencies from 
excluding or denying individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to 
access program benefits and services.203
 
 196. The lawsuit was litigated by the ACLU of Southern California, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights 
Project, Public Counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, ACLU of San Diego, ACLU of Arizona, Mental 
Health Advocacy Services, and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project. First Amended Complaint, 
supra note 
 The court reasoned that 
appointing counsel is the only reasonable accommodation through which 
167. 
 197. Id. at 4–6. 
 198. Press Release, ACLU, Immigrants with Mental Disabilities Lost in Detention for Years, 
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-prisoners-rights/immigrants-
mental-disabilities-lost-detention-years. 
 199. First Amended Complaint, supra note 167, at 4. 
 200. Id. at 35–40. 
 201. See Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction on Behalf of Seven Class Members at 12, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, (No. 10-
02211), 2013 WL 3674492, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
 202. The certified class was defined as “[a]ll individuals who are or will be in DHS custody for 
removal proceedings in California, Arizona, and Washington who have been identified by or to 
medical personnel, DHS, or an Immigration Judge, as having a serious mental disorder or defect that 
may render the incompetent to represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and who 
presently lack counsel in their removal proceedings.” Id. at 2. This class included two subclasses: 
(1) individuals who had a serious mental disorder or defect that rendered them incompetent to 
represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings; and (2) individuals who had been detained 
for more than six months. Id. 
 203. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2013). Establishing a prima facie case under section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act requires showing, among other things, that a recipience of federal funding denied someone a 
benefit solely because of a disability. Id. § 794(a). In this case, the benefit denied to the plaintiffs was 
full participation in their removal proceedings. See Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion, supra note 201, at 3.  
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mentally incompetent detainees in removal proceedings can meaningfully 
exercise certain statutory “benefits,” namely “a reasonable opportunity to 
examine the evidence against [them], to present evidence on [their] own 
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.”204 
In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly rejected the argument 
that In re M-A-M- provides sufficient safeguards.205 In addition, the court 
held that mentally incompetent detainees are entitled to a bond hearing 
within 180 days.206
While the decision in Franco-Gonzales represents a huge step 
forward, it has limitations. First, it focuses only on appointment of counsel 
as a procedural due process protection and does not address the issue of 
whether incompetent individuals may be subjected to removal proceedings 
in the first place. Furthermore, it does not question the definition of 
competence set forth in In re M-A-M- or recognize that a heightened 
standard of competence is necessary for self-representation. Thus, the 
category of individuals who would be appointed counsel under Franco-
Gonzales is smaller than the category of individuals who would be 
appointed counsel under the framework proposed in this Article. 
 
3. DHS Announces New Nationwide Policy in April 2013 
At the same time that the federal district court announced Franco-
Gonzalez, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and DHS announced a 
new nationwide policy for immigration detainees with serious mental 
disabilities.207 The government indicated that this policy would take effect 
nationally by the end of 2013, but a year later, as this Article goes to 
print, the implementation is just getting started.208 The policy addresses 
screening for mental conditions, competency hearings, appointment of 
counsel, and bond hearings. To begin with, the policy provides that 
detainees in a facility staffed by ICE Health Service Corps will be screened 
for serious mental disorders and conditions when taken into custody.209 
DHS states that it will also work with non-ICE Health Service Corps 
staffed detention facilities to identify detainees with serious mental 
disorders or conditions, although the policy fails to provide any specifics.210
 
 204. Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion, supra note 
 
201, at 6; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2014). 
 205. The court pointed out that it was undisputed that In re M-A-M- did not suggest any authority 
to appoint a “Qualified Representative” to incompetent individuals. The court also noted that the 
majority of safeguards in In re M-A-M- were left to the immigration judge’s discretion and therefore 
did not guarantee that an incompetent individual would be able to participate as fully in her removal 
proceeding as a competent person. Id. at 6–7. 
 206. Id. at 8. 
 207. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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In addition, the policy instructs immigration judges to convene a 
competency hearing if the court learns of any indication of mental 
incompetency.211 An immigration judge who feels unable to make a 
competency determination based on the evidence presented at that 
hearing is authorized to order an independent exam and psychiatric or 
psychological report.212 The competency exams will be administered 
through program run by the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”) and performed by independent medical professionals.213
The policy further provides that “EOIR will make available a 
qualified representative to detainees who are deemed mentally 
incompetent to represent themselves.”
 As of 
yet, the EOIR has not provided any details regarding the operation of 
this program or how the medical professionals will be selected or paid. 
214
If this policy is implemented, it will represent an enormous step 
forward in protecting the procedural due process rights of noncitizens 
with mental disabilities. One major limitation of the policy, however, is 
that it applies only to detainees. Non-detained individuals with serious 
mental disabilities in removal proceedings should also have a right to a 
competency hearing and appointed counsel. Another limitation of the 
policy is that it does not discuss termination of cases in which the 
respondent is incompetent. Termination would be consistent with 
recognizing a right to competence in removal proceedings, which either 
courts or Congress should do for the reasons set forth below. 
 To date, no details have been 
provided regarding who will be considered a “qualified representative,” 
how representatives will be selected and assigned to individual cases, and 
whether or how the representatives will be paid. The policy also does not 
specify whether qualified representatives will be made available only at 
the immigration court level or for appeals as well. Lastly, consistent with 
Franco-Gonzalez, the new policy states that detainees identified as 
having a serious mental disorder have a right to a bond hearing once they 
have been detained for six months. 
IV.  Reasons to Recognize a Right to Competence in Removal 
Proceedings 
Providing appointed counsel and competency hearings would 
significantly increase the procedural protections for individuals with 
mental disabilities facing removal. Several commentators have already 
argued quite persuasively that appointed counsel is critical for this 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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population.215 This Article goes further, however, arguing that the 
presence of counsel is not sufficient to protect the fairness and accuracy 
of the hearing, especially when the definition of incompetence indicates 
that the respondent is unable to assist counsel. Recognizing a substantive 
due process right to competence—or creating the right by statute—is the 
only way to ensure that incompetent individuals are not deported in 
error. Taking this step by no means eliminates the need for robust 
procedural protections. Procedural due process is necessary, at a 
minimum, to identify those who are truly incompetent.216
In addition, this Article contends that counsel must be appointed for 
those who do not meet the higher standard of competence required for 
self-representation. If counsel cannot be appointed to such individuals, 
then their cases also must be terminated. Defining the higher standard of 
competence is a challenging task that is beyond the scope of this 
Article.
 However, once 
an individual’s incompetence is established, a right to competence would 
serve as a backstop that prevents deportation. The reasons underlying 
the prohibition against the trial of incompetent individuals provide a 
roadmap for showing why such a right should also be recognized in 
removal proceedings. 
217 Indeed, it is not clear whether the standard should be precisely 
defined.218
 
 215. See generally Alice Clapman, Hearing difficult Voices: The Due Process Rights of Mentally 
Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 373 (2011) (arguing that mentally 
disabled individuals should have a right to counsel in removal proceedings); Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled 
and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 Geo. 
Immigr. L.J. 523 (2012) (same); Wilson & Prokop, supra note 192; see also Representation in Removal 
Proceedings, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1658, 1659 (2013) (proposing “a right to appointed counsel for three 
classes of noncitizens—lawful permanent residents, the mentally ill, and juveniles”). 
 This Article simply seeks to explain why courts should adopt a 
higher competence standard for self-representation in removal 
proceedings. This explanation draws on the same reasons underlying the 
prohibition against trial of incompetent individuals. As the Supreme 
Court stressed in Edwards, protecting the accuracy and dignity of the 
 216. Several individuals with serious mental conditions who took “voluntary deportations” turned 
out to be U.S. citizens. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 4. 
 217. For discussions of the standard for representational competence, see generally E. Lea Johnston, 
Representational Competence Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 523 (2011); E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard: A Critique of Bonnie’s Competency 
Standard and the Potential for Problem-Solving Theory for Self-Representation at Trial, 43 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1605 (2010); Jason R. Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-Representation in a Criminal Trial: 
Opportunity and Danger for State Courts After Indiana v. Edwards, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 825 (2010); see also 
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right to Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony 
Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 423, 447–50 (2007) (finding that twenty-six percent of pro se defendants 
received felony convictions, compared with sixty-three percent of their represented counterparts). 
 218. See, e.g., Jacob J. Stender, Protect Me From Myself: Determining Competency to Waive the 
Right to Counsel During Civil Commitment Proceedings in Washington State, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
973, 980–82 (arguing that “a heightened but unarticulated standard” for competency to represent 
oneself provides the discretion needed to make accurate and fair decisions based on the particular 
facts of the case). 
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proceedings becomes an especially critical concern when the defendant is 
unrepresented.219
Recognizing that competence falls along a spectrum rather than 
being a binary trait is especially important in the immigration context 
because of the high rates of pro se respondents.
 Likewise, in the removal context, the absence of a lawyer 
intensifies concerns about reaching the correct decision, protecting 
constitutional and statutory rights, and safeguarding the dignity of the 
process. 
220
A. Protecting the Fairness and Accuracy of Removal Proceedings 
 In the criminal context, 
where lawyers are generally appointed, the focus is understandably on 
competence to stand trial, but in the immigration context, the court 
should focus equally on competence for self-representation. While the 
relative sizes of these two groups may be different in the criminal and 
immigration contexts, it is still possible—and advisable—to consistently 
define the groups and their due process rights. The various reasons 
underlying the prohibition against trial of incompetent individuals, which 
also support a higher competence standard for self-representation, are 
addressed in detail below. 
Neither the “safeguards” mentioned in In re M-A-M- nor 
appointment of counsel is always sufficient to protect the fairness and 
accuracy of a removal proceeding. In criminal cases, counsel is almost 
always provided, yet concerns regarding fairness and accuracy still justify 
the prohibition against trial of incompetent individuals.221 These concerns 
are even greater in removal proceedings because the respondent 
generally plays a more active role than a defendant facing criminal trial. 
In removal proceedings, there is no prohibition against drawing an 
adverse inference if a respondent chooses not to testify.222
 
 219. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008). 
 Indeed, the 
 220. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 221. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 343 (1963) (holding, in a case involving a felony, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Sixth, so that “one charged with a crime” has a right to counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 
(1972) (extending Gideon to misdemeanors that carry jail sentences); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 
(1979) (holding that a defendant who faced only a fine, rather than incarceration, was not entitled to 
counsel); see also Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Towards a Sixth Amendment 
Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 585, 585 (2011) 
(explaining the limits of the Sixth Amendment and how criminal offenses that do not trigger the right to 
counsel can still expose a noncitizen to deportation). 
 222. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 309, 318 (1976) (recognizing that “the prevailing rule that 
the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they 
refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them”); Gutierrez v. Holder, 
662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011). But see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding that, 
in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s 
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”). 
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norm is for the respondent to testify in order to provide crucial evidence, 
establish her credibility, and merit a favorable exercise of discretion.223
1. Credibility Determinations 
 In 
cases where the respondent has legal status and is challenging 
deportability rather than applying for some form of relief, the legal issues 
may still turn on certain facts and require testimony by the respondent. If 
the respondent cannot communicate these facts, then appointment of 
counsel will not ensure a fair proceeding. This Subpart addresses both 
credibility determinations and citizenship determinations as two examples 
of important issues where the presence of an attorney may not overcome 
the challenges posed by incompetency. 
Establishing the noncitizen’s credibility is critical for virtually all 
applications for relief from removal. Credibility is especially important, 
however, in cases involving applications for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.224 In 
such cases, an adverse credibility finding may result in someone being 
removed to a country where her life or safety is in danger. Applicants for 
asylum and related forms of relief are also particularly likely to suffer 
from mental illnesses, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, related to 
past experiences of persecution that can affect the quality of their 
testimony.225
 
 223. See INA § 240(c)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2014). 
 In evaluating an applicant’s testimony, an immigration 
judge must “determine whether or not the testimony is credible, is 
 224. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the “Religious Imposter” 
Problem: A Case Study of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt, 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1179, 1185 
(2010) (noting that “[e]ven vague and incoherent testimony may not definitively indicate fraud, 
because cultural barriers, language and interpretation problems, mental health issues, and the general 
limitations of human memory and communication can produce honest testimony that nevertheless 
appears superficially incredible”); Stuart L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum 
Applicants: Don’t Be Fooled, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 725, 729 (2008) (discussing how 
psychological trauma can lead to inconsistencies that may be misinterpreted during an asylum hearing 
as showing a lack of credibility); Carol M. Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora’s Box: Innovative Techniques 
for Effectively Counseling Asylum Applicants Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
4 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 235, 241, 253–64 (2007) (addressing “how PTSD alters an asylum 
applicant’s detail and consistency of memory, thus affecting the applicant’s credibility and chance of 
being granted asylum”). See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
 225. See, e.g., Juliet Cohen, Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of Recall 
in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers. 13 Int’l J. Refugee L. 293, 308 (2001) (urging “great caution” in 
denying asylum based on credibility and noting that “a general impairment of recall is to be expected 
as a result of their traumatic experiences and physical and mental state”); Brianna M. Mooty, Solving 
the Medical Crisis for Immigration Detainees: Is the Proposed Detainee Basic Medical Care Act of 2008 
the Answer?, 28 Law. & Ineq. 223, 251 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he same experiences that are often 
the bedrock of asylum claims put these asylum-seekers at a significant risk of suffering post-traumatic 
stress and other mental health issues”); Suzuki, supra note 224 (explaining that post-traumatic stress 
disorder affects an asylum applicant’s memory, impacting the detail and consistency of the testimony); 
Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 36–37. 
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persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the 
applicant has satisfied the applicant’s burden of proof.”226 The INA 
further provides that a credibility determination should be based on the 
totality of the circumstances, including demeanor, responsiveness, 
plausibility, consistency, and any inaccuracies or falsehoods, regardless of 
whether or not they go to the heart of the claim.227
An individual with severe mental disabilities is likely to have great 
difficulty in providing testimony that satisfies all of the above criteria. 
Someone with paranoid schizophrenia may conflate real and imagined 
forms of persecution. If called upon to testify, this individual might easily 
lapse from an accurate account of her past and the harm that she fears 
into a delusional narrative. There is nothing an attorney could do to 
prevent this result. While the attorney could introduce evidence about 
the client’s mental illness and objective country reports about the harm 
that the individual would face if deported, the trial attorney and judge 
may still take the position that the person is not credible. In fact, Human 
Rights Watch has documented cases in which the mere presence of a 
mental illness has led to adverse credibility findings.
 
228
2. Citizenship Determinations 
 In such situations, 
where the respondent’s own testimony plays a crucial role in deciding 
whether she should be allowed to remain in the country, no amount of 
procedure can ensure that an incompetent individual will receive a fair 
and accurate hearing. Only a right to competence would protect against 
erroneous deportations. 
In some cases, critical facts might support a challenge to removability, 
but an attorney might have no way of accessing those facts if the client is 
incompetent. Multiple accounts of U.S. citizens with serious mental 
disabilities being erroneously deported to foreign countries show that 
DHS is often unaware of crucial facts when it decides to pursue 
deportation.229
 
 226. INA § 240(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). 
 In some cases, a mentally incompetent respondent might 
 227. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
 228. For example, Michael A. suffered from psychosis and was denied asylum because the asylum 
officer found that his delusions rendered his testimony inherently implausible, reasoning that his 
psychosis “calls into question the entire credibility of his claim.” Deportation by Default, supra note 
7, at 29. Likewise, the government argued that Edwin B., who had fled Liberia, was not a credible 
witness because of his mental disability and should be denied relief. Id. at 38. 
 229. In 2000, for example, immigration authorities deported Sharon McKnight, a U.S. citizen with 
cognitive disabilities who was returning from a trip to visit her family in Jamaica. Deportation by 
Default, supra note 7, at 4. In 2007, ICE wrongfully deported Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen with 
development disabilities, who was lost in Mexico for almost three months before being located and 
returned to in California. Id. In 2008, ICE deported a U.S. citizen named Mark Lyttle, who had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and development disabilities because, according to ICE, he had signed 
a statement saying that he was a Mexican national. Id.  
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not know where she was born or may be unable to intelligibly 
communicate this information. In other cases, determinations of 
citizenship can be very complex, requiring detailed information about the 
respondent’s parents or even grandparents. In Dent v. Holder, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit remanded a case where the petitioner’s claim 
to citizenship turned on an adoptive mother’s birth in the United 
States.230
According to Jacqueline Stevens, an estimated 4000 U.S. citizens 
were erroneously detained or deported as aliens in 2010, and the number 
has exceeded 20,000 since 2003.
 If Dent had been incompetent, he may never have been able to 
raise the issue of his citizenship, and a lawyer, even if he had one, might 
have no way of knowing about his adoptive mother. 
231 A “disproportionate” number of these 
individuals suffer from mental illness.232 In some cases, mental illness has 
led citizens to assert false claims of alienage.233 For example, when 
“Anna,” who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was arrested for 
prostitution in Phoenix in October 2007, she told police that she was 
born in Paris; earlier, in 1991, when applying for a U.S. passport, she had 
stated that she was born in Tehran.234 She had also reported at various 
points that “JFK is her father and the Pope is her father.”235 The Arizona 
Superior Court dismissed the criminal charges against her, finding her 
incompetent to stand trial.236 Yet, based solely on her claim that she was 
born in Paris, ICE detained Anna and placed her in removal 
proceedings.237 Despite having Anna’s psychiatric records, the immigration 
judge ordered her deported to France.238 France, of course, refused to 
issue travel documents because she was not a French citizen, but Anna 
remained detained for several months.239
 
 230. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 369–73 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 In this situation, where an 
immigration judge is inclined to believe statements made by a person 
 231. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens 
As Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 606, 608 (2011); see also Lisa DiVirgilio, Report: Hundreds of U.S. 
Citizens Wrongfully Deported Every Year, Syracuse (July 26, 2010, 9:52 AM), http:// 
www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/report_hundreds_of_us_citizens.html (describing how 
Francis’s story is part of a potentially larger trend of deportations of U.S. citizens). 
 232. Stevens, supra note 231, at 612. 
 233. See id. at 628; see also Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law, 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of Rachel Rosenbloom, Human Rights 
Fellow & Supervising Att’y, Ctr. for Human Rights & Int’l Justice at Boston Coll.) (“It is not uncommon 
for someone who is mentally ill and suffering from delusions to state that he or she was born abroad.”). 
 234. Jacqueline Stevens, Thin ICE, The Nation (June 5, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/thin-
ice. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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known to suffer from delusions, even the involvement of an attorney may 
not have helped. 
In other cases, U.S. citizens have been deported based on conflicting 
statements about their place of birth. For example, Mark Lyttle, a U.S. 
citizen with bipolar disorder and a learning disability, had sworn to 
immigration agents on two occasions that he was Mexican, but he had 
also sworn that he was born in North Carolina.240 He endured a horrific 
ordeal after ICE deemed him an undocumented immigrant from 
Mexico.241 Although ICE had substantial evidence of Lyttle’s citizenship, 
including criminal record checks that indicated he was a citizen, ICE 
detained him for fifty-one days and placed him in removal proceedings, 
where he was forced to represent himself and ultimately ordered 
deported.242 He spent four months wandering through Mexico and Central 
America homeless, and was even briefly jailed in Honduras, before he 
finally found a U.S. consular officer in Guatemala who contacted his 
family, realized that he was a U.S. citizen, and helped him return to the 
United States.243
Another example is Gustavo S., a native English speaker with 
schizophrenia who was charged with illegal entry based solely on his 
statement that he was born in Honduras.
 But what if Lyttle could not communicate that he was 
born in North Carolina and adopted? What if he did not have family 
members who could confirm his citizenship? Even if he had been 
appointed a lawyer during his removal proceeding, that lawyer might not 
have discovered that he is actually a U.S. citizen. 
244 Gustavo, like Lyttle, gave 
inconsistent accounts of his place of birth to ICE as well as to his 
attorney.245 Although the immigration judge disregarded Guastavo’s 
statement as unreliable in light of his mental disabilities, ICE nevertheless 
detained him for nineteen months based solely on his statement regarding 
his place of birth and ultimately deported him to Honduras after acquiring 
a travel document from the General Consul of Honduras using the 
information provided by DHS.246
 
 240. Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported To Mexico, Charlotte Observer (Aug. 30, 
2009), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2009/08/30/917007/nc-native-wrongly-deported-to.html. 
 Here, even the presence of an attorney 
did not prevent the erroneous deportation. These cases highlight 
situations in which the respondent’s incompetence undermines accurate 
decisions about deportability. An attorney who cannot access crucial 
 241. See id.; see also Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, ACLU 
(Apr. 25, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-its-
own-citizens; William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine: Annals of Immigration, New Yorker, 
Apr. 29, 2013, at 24. 
 242. Collins, supra note 240. 
 243. Bhandari, supra note 241. 
 244. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 45. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 46. 
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facts because of the client’s incompetence can do little to help protect the 
fairness and accuracy of the proceedings. 
B. Safeguarding Statutory and Constitutional Rights 
In addition to protecting the accuracy and reliability of the 
proceedings, a right to competence would safeguard other rights 
established by statute or required by procedural due process. As in 
criminal cases, where the Sixth Amendment provides that “the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation” and “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,”247 the 
INA gives certain rights directly to the noncitizen facing deportation. The 
INA guarantees that “the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to 
examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s 
own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the 
Government.”248
The emerging right to appointed counsel for incompetent detainees 
would add to the bundle of rights mentioned above. By definition, 
however, an incompetent individual does not have the ability to assist 
counsel and therefore cannot effectively exercise the right to counsel. 
Nor can counsel handle the case without the respondent’s participation. As 
discussed above, respondents play an active role in removal proceedings. 
Their input and cooperation is necessary in obtaining relevant facts, 
identifying witnesses, and providing testimony. Thus, the nature of the 
proceeding is nothing like habeas, where the attorney can carry the case 
alone.
 In both cases, these rights are given directly to the 
individual whose liberty is at stake, but incompetence undermines the 
ability to exercise these rights. 
249
 
 247. U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 An incompetent immigrant who lacks the ability to communicate 
relevant information to either counsel or the court simply cannot exercise 
the rights guaranteed by the INA and Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. 
 248. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2014) (emphasis added); see also Saidane v. INS, 
129 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he government must . . . afford the alien a reasonable 
opportunity to confront the witnesses against him or her.” (emphasis added)). As Justice Frankfurter 
explained in discussing the common law right of allocution, even the “modern innovation[]” of a right 
to counsel in criminal proceedings does not “lessen[] the need for the defendant, personally, to have 
the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation,” because “[t]he most persuasive counsel 
may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for 
himself.” Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
 249. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 705 (2013). 
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C. Upholding the Prohibition Against Proceeding in Absentia 
Deporting incompetent respondents also conflicts with the general 
prohibition against conducting removal proceedings in absentia.250 As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Drope, “the mentally incompetent 
defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality 
afforded no opportunity to defend himself.”251 Likewise, an incompetent 
respondent may be physically present but is absent from the hearing for 
all practical purposes. The INA provides that a hearing may take place 
“in the absence of the alien” only “when agreed to by the parties.”252 
Moreover, the INA gives the respondent the right to “cross-examine 
witnesses,” much like the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 
which is the primary basis for the prohibition against in absentia trials of 
criminal defendants.253 The statutory requirements to proper notice of 
the time and place of the hearing, as well as the requirement to give 
notice of the consequences for failure to appear, all underscore the right 
to be present.254 In fact, the BIA has repeatedly held that an immigration 
judge “has no authority to order an alien’s removal from the United 
States in absentia unless the alien has received (or can be properly 
charged with receiving), at his last provided address, the . . . warnings and 
advisals contained in the Notice to Appear.”255
If the respondent receives proper notice and nevertheless fails to 
appear, she may be ordered deported in absentia because the absence is 
considered consensual in this situation, but the same is true in many 
 
 
 250. This prohibition stems not only from the INA, see infra notes 252–254, 256, but also from basic 
principles of due process. The Supreme Court has held that the right to appear attaches in various civil 
contexts where a liberty interest is at stake. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (extending 
the right to an oral hearing to social security overpayment recoupment proceedings); Morrisey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (applying a right to be present in a parole revocation hearing); Specht v. Patterson, 
386 U.S. 605 (1967) (holding that the right to be present exists in civil commitment proceedings). 
 251. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Foote, supra note 54); see also 
McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 951–52 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Drope and Foote, supra note 54); 
Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 171); Eddmonds v. 
Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; Foote, supra note 54, at 
834); Stone v. United States, 358 F.2d 503, 507 n.5 (9th Cir. 1966) (quoting Foote, supra note 54, at 
834). 
 252. The INA provides that the proceeding may take place: “(i) in person, (ii)where agreed to by 
the parties, in the absence of the alien, (iii) through video conference, or (iv) subject to subparagraph 
(B), through telephone conference.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A) (2014). For the proceeding to take 
place by telephone, the alien must have been advised of the right to proceed in person or through 
video conference and must consent to the telephone conference. Id. § 1229a(b)(2)(B). 
 253. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). 
 254. See INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). 
 255. In re Jorge Anyelo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 337, 339 (B.I.A. 2010); see In re G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
181, 187 (B.I.A. 2001). 
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criminal proceedings.256 State criminal courts routinely construe the 
failure to show up for trial as a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right 
to be present and conduct the trial in the defendant’s absence.257 Federal 
courts are more constrained in this matter, as they must abide by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c), which permits an in absentia trial only 
if the defendant was present at trial initially or had pleaded guilty or nolo 
contendere.258 The Supreme Court confirmed in Crosby v. United States 
that a defendant’s initial presence is required for an in absentia trial 
under Rule 43.259 The Sixth Amendment, however, does not require this 
initial presence. In other words, as the Second Circuit has explained, 
“nothing in the Constitution prohibits a trial from being commenced in the 
defendant’s absence so long as the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waives his right to be present.”260 Accordingly, state courts are free to 
proceed with a trial if the defendant was properly notified and never 
showed up, as long as “the requisite knowledge can be conclusively 
found” based on the record.261 The constitutional prohibition against in 
absentia trials is therefore no more absolute than the INA provision: 
both permit a waiver of the right to be present. Mentally incompetent 
individuals, however, do not have the capacity to waive the right to be 
present in a criminal case or to “consent” to an in absentia removal 
hearing under the INA.262
The following statutory provision adds a layer of complexity to this 
analysis: “If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency 
for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall 




 256. See INA § 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (stating that an alien who fails to appear after 
receiving proper notice may be ordered removed in absentia if DHS “establishes by clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided and that the alien is removable”). 
 
 257. Pennsylvania, for example, allows fugitive defendants to be tried in absentia, and some judges 
do this “routinely.” See Walter M. Phillips, Jr., Report of Subcommittee on Trying Fugitive 
Defendants in Absentia 10 (discussing the practices in Pennsylvania). Some states, but not all, 
require an on-the-record colloquy prior to finding waiver of the right to be present, which is similar to 
the oral warnings given by immigration judges (unless waived by the respondent’s attorney) and set 
forth in writing on the Notice to Appear. See id. at 10; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.180 (allowing an in 
absentia trial if the defendant is voluntarily absent, even in capital cases); Peede v. State, 474 So.2d 808 
(Fla. 1985) (upholding the in absentia trial of a defendant accused of murder). 
 258. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c). 
 259. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993). Some federal courts have since found that 
technical violations of Rule 43 resulted only in “harmless errors.” See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 
654 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the court’s error in barring the defendants from trial on 
the day before trial, rather than on the first morning of trial, in violation of Rule 43, was “harmless”). 
 260. Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 884 (1999). 
 261. Id. at 76. Smith claimed that he missed the trial because he overslept, but the Second Circuit 
noted that he made no attempt to contact the court and thereafter remained a fugitive. Id. at 77. By 
declining certiorari in Smith, the Supreme Court implicitly agreed with the Second Circuit’s analysis. 
 262. Waiver of a constitutional right must also be “competent” and “intelligent” under Supreme 
Court precedents. See infra note 303. 
 263. INA § 240(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2014). 
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While this statutory provision does not explicitly prohibit removal 
proceedings if the respondent is incompetent, it indicates that Congress 
was aware of a potential problem related to in absentia hearings for 
mentally incompetent respondents. Since no safeguards have been 
prescribed, the provision is of limited practical use, and the best approach 
is to read it together with the other statutory provisions cited above. The 
INA’s prohibition against proceeding “in the absence of the alien,” unless 
the respondent gives consent, does not include any exceptions, so that 
prohibition should be interpreted as applying to mentally incompetent 
individuals as well.264
D. Protecting the Dignity of the Individual and the Legal Process 
 Relying on that prohibition, courts could conclude 
that it is not possible to pursue removal when the respondent is 
incompetent. 
Courts and commentators alike have identified the preservation of 
dignity as one of the reasons underlying the prohibition against subjecting 
an incompetent defendant to trial. This concept of dignity has different 
aspects. First, the defendant herself may be stripped of dignity by being 
transformed into a “spectacle,” especially if she is attempting to conduct 
her own defense.265 Second, the legal proceeding in which such a 
spectacle occurs appears undignified and unfair.266 Third, the legal process 
loses dignity by becoming unhinged from the purposes of punishment, 
such as deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. Criminal prosecution 
does not serve these purposes when a defendant cannot comprehend the 
alleged wrongdoing, understand the nature of the proceedings, or grasp 
why she is being punished.267
Although deportation is not technically “punishment,” the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly recognized that it is a very severe penalty that is 
closely related to criminal punishment.
 
268 In fact, the Court has 
acknowledged that it is often “the most important part . . . of the penalty 
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to 
specified crimes.”269
 
 264. INA § 240(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(B). 
 Many noncitizens would prefer a temporary jail 
 265. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). 
 266. See id. (stating that criminal “proceedings must not only be fair, they must ‘appear fair to all 
who observe them’” (citations omitted)); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 658, 658 n.2 (4th Cir. 
1969) (“[T]he idea of sentencing an insane person to prison remains offensive and is incompatible with 
the dignity of the judicial process.”) (citing Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for 
Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 831 (1968)). 
 267. See, e.g., Dillard, supra note 90, at 470–71; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the 
Insanity Plea—Clues To the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 
73 Yale L.J. 425, 433–41 (1964); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 401, 404–06 (1958). 
 268. See supra note 3. 
 269. Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). 
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sentence to permanent exile. Subjecting incompetent individuals to 
deportation when they may not understand the meaning of legal status or 
comprehend why they are being separated from their families and forced 
to leave the country raises the same moral questions and poses the same 
threat to dignity as punishing incompetent defendants. 
Moreover the same threat to the appearance of fairness exists in the 
deportation context because removal proceedings are intensely adversarial 
and have many of the trappings of criminal trials.270 Among other aspects, 
the government files the charging document, formal notice must be given 
to the respondent, the functions of the trial attorney and immigration 
judge are equivalent to the functions of the prosecutor and judge in a 
criminal proceeding, and the respondent may be detained during the 
proceedings.271 Differences do exist between removal proceedings and 
criminal proceedings, of course, but these differences reflect the greater 
protections that criminal defendants receive. Their absence from removal 
proceedings therefore only amplifies the appearance of unfairness. For 
example, the fact that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply in removal proceedings makes it even more 
likely that the removal proceeding against an incompetent respondent 
will appear undignified and unfair, and the lower burden of proof, which 
facilitates deportation, only highlights the imbalance of power between 
the parties.272
E. Removal as an Extension of the Criminal Process 
 Recognizing a substantive right to competence in removal 
proceedings would therefore help preserve the moral dignity of the 
removal process and the appearance of fairness. 
Not only do removal proceedings have the same trappings as criminal 
trials, but immigration enforcement has become inextricably intertwined 
with criminal enforcement.273
 
 270. See Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1024 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that removal 
proceedings closely resemble a trial and “are adversarial and employ many of the same procedures 
used in Article III courts”); Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Etchu-Njang 
v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 2005) (contrasting “adversarial” removal proceedings with 
“inquisitorial” Social Security benefit proceedings); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 699 
(6th Cir. 2002) (“It is clear that removal proceedings are decidedly adversarial.”). 
 As Ingrid V. Eagly explains, this comingling 
of criminal and immigration enforcement begins at the early, investigatory 
stages of the criminal process and extends to decisions made during 
 271. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (service of Notice to Appear); id. § 1229a (role of immigration judge and 
conduct of removal proceedings); id. § 1226 (detention).  
 272. The Supreme Court has also noted that removal proceedings “look[] prospectively to the 
respondent’s right to remain in this country,” whereas criminal proceedings seek to punish past acts; 
the government must show only identity and alienage, and the burden then shifts to respondent to 
prove time, place, and manner of entry; Miranda warnings are not required; the Ex Post Facto Clause 
does not apply; and the Eighth Amendment does not require bail to be granted in certain cases. See 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 273. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 9, at 1143–56. 
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booking, pretrial release, plea-bargaining and sentencing.274 State and local 
officials involved in the criminal process are attuned to defendants’ 
immigration status and the conviction-driven system of immigration 
enforcement, while, at the same time, federal immigration agents are 
embedded in local law enforcement systems.275 Eagly observes that “the 
growing centrality of criminality to immigration enforcement is one of 
the most significant historical shifts in the federal immigration system.”276
The integrated nature of immigration and criminal enforcement 
calls for a consistent approach to questions of competence during these 
processes. In the criminal context, the law is clear that a defendant must 
be competent at all stages of the prosecution.
 
277 The right to competence 
therefore extends all the way to sentencing. Competence during the 
penalty phase is particularly important because it represents the moment 
“when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce whether it 
will deprive . . . [someone] of liberty.”278 Pronouncing the sentence when 
the defendant is incompetent is akin to sentencing someone in absentia 
and “shows a lack of fundamental respect for the dignity” of the 
defendant.279 Ensuring the defendant’s presence and competence at 
sentencing simply “enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both 
sentence and conviction.”280 In this respect, the right to competence has 
an especially long reach; other rights, such as the right to a jury trial and 
the right to be confronted with witnesses, do not extend to the sentencing 
phase.281
The question then becomes, precisely when does the right to 
competence end? Since there is no dispute that it extends to the penalty 
 
 
 274. Id. at 1147–56. 
 275. Id. at 1134. 
 276. Id. at 1129. 
 277. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) (“Even when a defendant is competent at the 
commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that 
would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.”); United States 
v. Rickert, 685 F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[A] defendant must be competent at all stages of the 
prosecution, including sentencing.”); United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“Whether the defendant is competent is an ongoing inquiry; the defendant must be competent at all 
stages of trial.”); United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[U]nquestionably, ‘the 
need for competency extends beyond the trial to the sentencing phase of a proceeding.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1115 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 905 (1990)); United 
States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1544 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The need for competency survives trial and 
extends through the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding.”); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 
658, 658 n.2 (4th Cir.) (finding that an incompetent defendant may not be “effectively present” at 
sentencing and that passing sentence under such conditions might violate due process), cert. denied 
396 U.S. 970 (1969); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(A), (C). 
 278. Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 831 (1968). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462–63 (1984) (holding that the right to jury trial does not 
apply at sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (holding that the sentencing judge 
may consider reports of probation officers and psychiatrists without affording any cross-examination). 
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phase, the issue may be reframed as whether deportation is also part of 
that penalty phase. The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla suggests that 
it is. In addition to describing deportation as “an integral part . . . of the 
penalty” that results from a conviction, Padilla went on to explain:282
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is 
nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has 
enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for 
nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration 
law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of 
noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the 
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. . . . 
 
Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because 
of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to 
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.283
In concluding that deportation is “not categorically removed from 
the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,”
 
284
V.  Potential Concerns with a Right to Competence in Removal 
Proceedings 
 the Court 
recognized that there is no bright line between the criminal sentence and 
the deportation that routinely follows. The erosion of the boundary 
between these two penalty phases creates room for courts to find that the 
right to competence should span both proceedings. Even in cases in 
which the criminal process does not reach the penalty phase, however, 
the interlocking nature of criminal and immigration enforcement 
supports extending the right to competence to removal proceedings. 
While a substantive right to competence could prevent many forms of 
injustice, it also has some potential drawbacks. First, it may open the door 
to indefinite civil commitment. As criminal defense lawyers are well aware, 
a finding of incompetence may result in a long period of civil commitment 
when a guilty plea would have led to a much shorter jail sentence.285
 
 282. Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). 
 
Second, recognizing a right to competence in removal proceedings may 
mean that an incompetent individual would be forced to forfeit a chance at 
being granted legal status by the immigration judge. There is no analog for 
this concern in the criminal context because defendants cannot gain any 
benefits through the criminal system; at best they can preserve the status 
quo. This Part explores both of these issues and suggests that these 
concerns may not be as significant as they initially appear. 
 283. Id. at 365–66 (citations omitted). 
 284. Id. at 366. 
 285. See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
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A. The Risk of Indefinite Civil Commitment 
As noted above, if a criminal defendant is not competent and will not 
become competent in the foreseeable future, the state must either initiate 
civil commitment proceedings or release the defendant and dismiss the 
charges.286 Defense attorneys would often prefer to avoid the risk of civil 
commitment by opting not to raise the issue of competency and accepting 
a conviction that will result in a relatively short sentence or perhaps just 
a fine.287 Various scholars have debated whether defense attorneys may 
legally and ethically make these types of strategic decisions about whether 
to raise competency.288 Some have argued that defense attorneys should 
be able to “waive” the right to competence, although the waiver of a 
constitutional right must normally be made “competently and 
intelligently.”289
 
 286. Id. 
 These debates reflect the gravity of the threat of civil 
commitment in the criminal context. In the immigration context, however, 
the threat may not be as significant. There are at least two reasons why 
this would be true. First, many noncitizens in removal proceedings would 
not meet the standard for civil commitment, which requires a finding of 
dangerousness. Second, neither immigration judges nor DHS are currently 
 287. See, e.g., Dillard, supra note 90, at 465–66. 
 288. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) standard provides that defense attorneys must raise 
the issue of incompetence whenever they have a “good faith doubt” that the defendant is competent to 
stand trial, but scholars have argued that attorneys may legally and ethically act more strategically in 
deciding whether to raise the issue. See, e.g., Albert J. Diaz et al., ABA Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards 7-4.2(c) (“Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s 
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to the defendant’s 
competence.”). But see Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing 
the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 67 
(proposing that defense attorneys make case-by-case determinations regarding whether to raise 
competency concerns); Bonnie, supra note 58, at 564–65 (arguing that “procedural due process does 
not always require the defense attorney to bring her doubts about a defendant’s competence to 
judicial attention”); John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment: Ethics and the 
Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 207, 235 (2008) (arguing that the ABA standard is 
“outrageous” and “not justified by history, necessity, or logic and undermines the integrity of the 
attorney-client relationship and, therefore, the integrity of the criminal justice system”); Dillard, supra 
note 90, at 465–66 (explaining that the category of “marginally competent defendants” creates room to 
confront the determinate criminal justice system rather than face indefinite civil commitment). 
 289. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that a criminal defendant may not 
waive right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently”); Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966) (“[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be 
incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his 
capacity to stand trial.”); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (“A finding that a defendant is 
competent to stand trial . . . is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or 
waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or 
waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is 
knowing and voluntary.”). But see Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 
32 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 959 (1985) (arguing that the defendant or defense counsel should be able to 
waive competency). Richard Bonnies criticized Winick’s waiver argument as inconsistent with the 
Constitution and the interests of society. See Bonnie, supra note 58, at 542–48. 
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authorized to initiate civil commitment proceedings. This Subpart 
discusses each of these reasons in detail. 
1. The Assessment of Dangerousness 
The standard for civil commitment in most states requires showing, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual poses a danger to 
self or others and that the danger is in the near future.290 While the 
Supreme Court has never held that a finding of dangerousness is 
constitutionally required for civil commitment, it has explained that the 
mere presence of mental illness is not enough.291 In the case of an 
incompetent defendant, the criminal charges that led to the initiation of 
civil commitment proceedings impact the assessment of dangerousness, 
even though the defendant was never convicted. Empirical research 
confirms that perceived criminal status affects how hospitals assess and 
treat patients.292 Therefore, immigration lawyers representing mentally 
incompetent individuals with criminal records have good reason to be 
concerned about the risk of civil commitment. Currently, about half of 
the individuals subject to an ICE detainer have a criminal conviction, and 
fourteen percent are identified as posing a serious threat to public safety 
or national security.293 If one removes from the analysis traffic violations 
and marijuana possession, which are likely to be viewed as non-
dangerous crimes, two-thirds of detainers involve individuals with no 
criminal record.294
 
 290. Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency To Make Medical Treatment Decisions 
and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 561, 567 (2012) (tracing the history of 
the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) 
(holding that the burden of proof for civil commitment is “clear and convincing evidence,” which is an 
intermediate standard between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “a preponderance of the evidence”). 
 Thus, many noncitizens, but far from all, will have a 
criminal record that clouds any assessment of dangerousness. 
 291. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[T]here is . . . no constitutional basis for 
confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.”). 
The court did not decide “whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill 
individual for the purpose of treatment.” Id. at 573. 
 292. One study found that “forensic patients” (those who have been accused of crimes) spend four 
times as long in the hospital as “civil patients” and that the length of the hospitalization corresponds to 
the seriousness of the alleged crime. Robert D. Miller et al., Judicial Oversight of Release of Patients 
Committed After Being Found Not Competent To Stand Trial or Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity in 
Violent Crimes, 28 J. Forensic Sci. 839, 842 (1983). Another study found that individuals whose 
criminal charges had been dismissed based on a finding that they were not competent and not 
restorable to competency were treated differently for purposes of civil commitment than other 
members of the community whose conditions had simply deteriorated to the point of being committed. 
Gwen A. Levitt et al., Civil Commitment Outcomes of Incompetent Defendants, 38 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 349, 357 (2010). 
 293. Few ICE Detainers Target Serious Criminals, TRAC (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/330 (reporting on data from ICE for FY 2012 and the first four months of FY 
2013). 
 294. Id. TRAC further reports that in Fiscal Year 2013, about fourteen percent of deportation 
filings were based on alleged criminal activity, but the fact that ICE did not charge a criminal ground 
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Of course, even those without a criminal record may be perceived as 
dangerous simply because of their mental illness. Numerous studies have 
shown that mentally ill individuals are stigmatized as dangerous, with 
factors such as the individual’s race, age, and education affecting people’s 
perceptions of danger.295 The evidence regarding whether the mentally ill 
are actually more violent than members of the general population is 
mixed, but the consensus seems to be that there is a modest but statistically 
significant relationship between severe mental illness and violence.296 
Some studies have found that the relationship between mental illness and 
violence disappears when one takes into account substance abuse as a 
compounding factor, while other studies indicate that substance abuse 
only makes the relationship between severe mental illness and violence 
stronger.297
 
in other cases does not mean the respondents in those cases had no criminal history; ICE does not 
need to charge a criminal ground if the person is otherwise removable. See U.S. Deportation 
Proceedings in Immigration Courts, TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/ 
deport_filing_charge.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (search “Fiscal Year” “2013” and “2014”). 
 Factors such as a history of violent victimization and 
 295. Nava R. Silton et al., Stigma in America: Has Anything Changed?: Impact of Perceptions of 
Mental Illness and Dangerousness on the Desire for Social Distance: 1996 and 2006, 199 J. Nervous & 
Mental Disease 361, 365 (2011) (finding, inter alia, that race, education, age, and religious practices 
affect perceptions of dangerousness). See Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: 
Labels, Causes, Dangerousness and Social Distance, 89 Am. J. Pub. Health 1328, 1330–31 (1999); 
Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, and Need for 
Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 Am. J. Pub. Health 1339, 1342 (1999); 
Richard A. Van Dorn et al., A Comparison of Stigmatizing Attitudes Towards Persons with Schizophrenia 
in Four Stakeholder Groups: Perceived Likelihood of Violence and Desire for Social Distance, 
68 Psychiatry: Interpersonal & Biological Processes 152, 154 (2005); M.C. Angermeyer et al., 
Mental Disorder and Violence: Results of Epidemiological Studies in the Era of De-institutionalization, 
33 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology S1, S4 (1998). See generally J.C. Phelan & B.G. Link, 
The Growing Belief that People with Mental Illness Are Violent: The Role of the Dangerousness 
Criterion for Civil Commitment, 33 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology S7 (1998) (discussing 
the possibility that the adoption of the dangerousness criterion for civil commitment may have had the 
unintended consequence of increasing the stigma of mental illness in the United States). 
 296. See, e.g., Richard Van Dorn et al., Mental Disorder and Violence: Is There a Relationship 
Beyond Substance Use?, 47 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 487, 487 (2011) (stating that 
the consensus indicates “a modest, yet statistically significant relationship between severe mental 
illness . . . and violence”); Arthur J. Lurigio & Andrew J. Harris, Mental Illness, Violence, and Risk 
Assessment: An Evidence-Based Review, 4 Victims & Offenders 341, 344 (2009) (finding that the best 
designed and most statistically sophisticated studies show a modest relationship between severe 
mental illness and violence). 
 297. See Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence and Mental 
Disorder: Results from the National Epidemiologoical Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, 
66 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 152, 155 (2009) (finding that serious mental illness was statistically 
unrelated to community violence unless comorbid substance abuse or dependence was involved); 
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., The Social-Environmental Context of Violent Behavior in Persons Treated 
for Severe Mental Illness, 92 Am. J. Pub. Health 1523, 1529 (2002) (finding that people with mental 
illness who had no other risk factors for violence, such as substance use, were no more likely to engage 
in assaultive acts than members of the general population). But see Van Dorn et al., supra note 296, at 
501 (finding that substance abuse makes the relationship between severe mental illness and violence 
even stronger). 
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exposure to community violence have also been found to affect 
propensity for violence among the mentally ill.298 There is no dispute, 
however, that “most people with mental illness are not violent, [and] that 
most violent acts are committed by people who are not mentally ill.”299
The research mentioned above provides several important lessons 
for immigration lawyers concerned about the possibility of civil 
commitment. First, if the respondent has been charged or convicted of a 
crime, especially a violent crime, the immigration lawyer should think 
carefully about how to approach questions of competency—much like a 
criminal defense lawyer. The risk of a dangerousness finding is likely 
reduced when the respondent has no criminal history. The lawyer must 
still consider, however, whether the client is likely to be considered a 
danger to self or others based on the client’s particular mental disability 
and any compounding factors that may be present. The importance of 
these specific, contextualizing factors should not be underestimated. In 
some cases, the client may struggle with a mental illness or cognitive 
deficiencies that create no risk of dangerous behavior, while other cases 
will call for much more caution. 
 
2. The Limited Powers of Immigration Judges 
In addition, civil commitment is a more remote possibility in the 
removal context than the criminal context because the statutory powers 
of immigration judges differ from the powers of state court judges. Many 
state statutes require the court, district attorney, or medical institution to 
initiate involuntary commitment proceedings if the defendant is found 
incompetent and cannot be restored to competency within a reasonable 
period of time.300 In fact, state statues often authorize the same judge 
who found the defendant incompetent to determine whether that 
defendant poses a danger to self or others for purposes of civil 
commitment.301
 
 298. Swanson et al., supra note 
 
297, at 1528–29. 
 299. Van Dorn et al., supra note 296, at 487. 
 300. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.110 (LexisNexis 2008) (providing that if a defendant is 
found incompetent to stand trial, the court “shall conduct an involuntary hospitalization proceeding” 
and, if there is a substantial probability that the defendant will gain competency in the foreseeable 
future, the court “shall commit” the defendant to a treatment facility for sixty days); W. Va. Code 
Ann. § 27-6A-3(a) (1999) (“The court shall commit such defendant to a mental health facility under 
the jurisdiction of the department of health”); Ind. Code § 35-36-3-3(b) (2013) (“If a substantial 
probability [of restoring competency] does not exist, the state institution . . . or the third party 
contractor shall initiate regular commitment proceedings.”). Some states require initiation of civil 
proceedings only for certain enumerated crimes. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-1.6(C) (1978) 
(dealing with commitment due to mental retardation); see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. 
Gutheil, Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law 137 (4th ed. 2007) (reviewing state 
commitment statutes). 
 301. See Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 300. 
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Immigration judges, on the other hand, have no such power. 
Immigration judges only have the authority delegated to them by the 
Attorney General.302 The limited matters over which they have jurisdiction 
are carefully delineated in the regulations.303 These regulations provide 
that an immigration judge may determine removability, adjudicate certain 
applications for relief from removal, and, where appropriate, order 
withholding of removal under the INA or the Convention Against 
Torture.304 Insofar as the regulations state that an immigration judge may 
also “take any other action consistent with applicable law and regulations 
as may be appropriate,” the judge is still limited to matters over which 
she has been granted jurisdiction by the statute or regulations.305
The BIA has narrowly construed an immigration judge’s regulatory 
grant of powers, finding, for example, that an immigration judge does not 
have authority to order discovery,
 Thus, 
nothing in the regulations currently gives an immigration judge the 
authority to order an agency to initiate civil commitment proceedings. 
306 cannot adjudicate a type of 
application not specifically named in the regulations,307 and cannot 
review DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings against a 
given individual.308
Similarly, nothing in the statute or regulations gives DHS the 
authority to initiate civil commitment proceedings. The regulations give 
 Given that the INA and regulations make no mention 
of any authority to initiate a totally separate type of proceeding, such as 
civil commitment proceedings, that action would lie far outside the scope 
of an immigration judge’s delegated powers. 
 
 302. In re Fede, 20 I. & N. Dec. 35, 35–36 (B.I.A. 1989) (“The Board and immigration judges . . . 
only have such authority as is created and delegated by the Attorney General.”). 
 303. See Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.1(a)(1) (2013) (describing the matters over which an immigration judge has jurisdiction); 
Executive Office for Immigration Review Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2013) (describing the matters 
over which the BIA has appellate jurisdiction); see also In re Hernandez-Puente, 20 I. & N. Dec. 335, 
339 (B.I.A. 1991) (stating that immigration judges “have no jurisdiction unless it is affirmatively 
granted by the regulations”); In re Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 299, 300–01 (B.I.A. 1985); In re Zaidan, 19 I. 
& N. Dec. 297, 298 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 304. Executive Office for Immigration Review Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a)(1); In re Hernandez-
Puente, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 339. 
 305. See Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.1(a)(1)(iv). An immigration judge could not, therefore, take action based on another source of 
law outside the INA and its regulations. See, e.g., Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 972, 977 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (finding that an immigration judge did not have jurisdiction over questions of customary 
international law). 
 306. In re Henriquez Rivera, 25 I. & N. Dec. 575, 579 (B.I.A. 2011) (holding that the immigration 
judge erred in ordering DHS to provide the Immigration Court with an applicant’s complete 
administrative record from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)). 
 307. In re Hernandez-Puente, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 339. 
 308. DHS is given sole authority to determine whether to commence proceedings under the INA. 
See In re Lujan-Quintana, 25 I. & N. Dec. 53, 56 (B.I.A. 2009); In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 281, 284 
(B.I.A. 1998) (“[T]he decision to institute deportation proceedings involves the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and is not a decision which the Immigration Judge or the Board may review.”). 
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DHS only the power to “present on behalf of the government evidence 
material to the issues of deportability or inadmissibility and any other 
issues that may require disposition by the immigration judge.”309 DHS, like 
any other administrative agency, is limited to enforcement of its statute. 
Agency action outside statutory limits is considered ultra vires and 
invalid.310 Initiating civil commitment proceedings has nothing to do with 
enforcement of the INA and bears no relevance to issues of deportability 
and inadmissibility. As a practical matter, DHS also has limited financial 
resources. Because DHS does not even have the resources to pursue 
removal proceedings against everyone who lacks legal status, initiating 
an entirely different type of proceeding unrelated to immigration seems 
out of the question.311 For all of these reasons, civil commitment poses 
less of a threat in the removal context than the criminal context.312
Although mentally incompetent individuals could be subject to 
regular immigration detention while their competence is being evaluated 
or while attempts are made to restore competence, the new DHS policy 
discussed above purports to prevent prolonged detention of these 
individuals by giving them the right to a bond hearing after six months.
 
313 
Moreover, at least one federal appellate court—the Ninth Circuit—has 
curtailed the risk of prolonged detention by taking the more sweeping 
step of holding that detainees subject to mandatory detention and those 
classified as arriving aliens, over whom immigration courts traditionally 
had no bond jurisdiction, must be given a bond hearing after six months 
of detention.314
 
 309. Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a). 
 
 310. Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961) (“[T]he determinative 
question is not what the [agency] thinks it should do but what Congress has said it can do.”); id. at 328 
(finding that a federal agency cannot “do indirectly what it cannot do directly”); Gibas v. Saginaw 
Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112, 1117 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[A]dministrative agencies are vested only with the 
authority given to them by Congress.”). 
 311. The cost of civil commitment often exceeds the cost of criminal incarceration due to the need 
for higher numbers of staff and more medical care. For example, a study showed that the cost of civil 
commitment in Minnesota is $120,000 per year for a sex offender, which is three times the cost of 
criminal incarceration. Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minn., Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders x (2011), available at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf. The annual 
cost of civil commitment programs in other states with secure facilities range from around $36,000 to 
$180,000 per year. Id.  
 312. It is, of course, possible that Congress could amend the INA to grant immigration judges or 
DHS the power to initiate civil commitment proceedings. Given how thinly resources are stretched 
within these agencies, however, it seems unlikely that Congress would be able to add this task, which is 
unrelated to immigration enforcement, to their workload. 
 313. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5. 
 314. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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B. Forfeiting the Chance to Gain Legal Status 
In a subset of cases, immigration lawyers may want to proceed 
despite a client’s incompetence because they believe that the client is 
eligible for some form of relief and has a strong chance of being granted 
legal status. There are certain applications for relief that can only be 
granted in removal proceedings, such as various forms of cancellation of 
removal, which lead to lawful permanent residence.315 Moreover, if the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has 
decided not to grant an affirmative asylum application, the immigration 
court obtains jurisdiction over the application.316 If the judge grants 
asylum, the respondent becomes eligible to apply for lawful permanent 
residence one year later.317 Applications for withholding of removal and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture may be adjudicated 
only by the immigration court.318 While these forms of relief do not lead 
to lawful permanent residence, they do allow people to live and work 
legally in the United States.319
Attorneys who believe a case is so strong that they can win it despite 
the client’s incompetence may not want the case to be terminated. 
Perhaps the country conditions are so horrific, the corroborating 
evidence so overwhelming, and the expert testimonies so persuasive that 
the lawyer feels confident that the respondent will prevail even if she 
does not testify or testifies poorly. Such cases may be rare but are 
certainly conceivable. For example, a survivor of genocide might prevail 
with little testimony, even if she is mentally incompetent. Recognizing a 
substantive right to competence need not, however, result in forfeiting 
relief. The unique nature of immigration proceedings, which expose the 
respondent to deportation yet also provide an opportunity to obtain legal 
status, requires a contextualized understanding of the right to competence. 
 
 
 315. See Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.1(a)(ii) (2013) (providing that the immigration judge shall have authority to determine 
applications under sections 240A(a) and (b) of the INA, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(a)–
(b), which pertain to cancellation of removal). The statutory language in section 1229(b)(a) and (b) 
provides that the “Attorney General may cancel removal” for certain individuals. 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229b(a)–(b) (2012). Congress delegated primary authority to administer the INA to the Attorney 
General, who, in turn, delegated that authority to various agencies within the Department of Justice, 
including the EOIR. The EOIR is composed of the Immigration Courts and the BIA. See Stephen H. 
Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 3 (5th ed. 2009). 
 316. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(ii); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal Rule, 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(b) (2013); see also Obtaining Asylum in the United States, USCIS (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (describing 
the affirmative and defensive application processes). 
 317. Adjustment of Status of refugees and Aliens Granted Asylum Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1209.2(a) (2013). 
 318. Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.1(a)(iii); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal Rule, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(a), 
1208.17 (2013). 
 319. Control of Employment of Aliens Rule, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1274a.12(a)(10), (c)(8), (c)(18) (2009). 
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This contextualized understanding calls for bifurcating the issue of 
deportation from applications for relief or, at a minimum, paying close 
attention to the level of participation actually needed in a particular case, 
as well as the attorney’s judgment about the client’s ability to assist, when 
making competency determinations. 
1. Bifurcating Deportation from Applications for Relief 
The basic purpose of recognizing a substantive due process right to 
competence is to prevent an incompetent individual from being deported 
erroneously and unfairly, while also preserving the dignity of the removal 
process.320
Permitting an incompetent individual to pursue an application in 
immigration court does not really differ from allowing an incompetent 
individual to be a litigant in an ordinary civil case. Once deportation is 
off the table, the case loses its quasi-criminal component. Just as an 
incompetent individual can pursue a civil claim with an attorney, next 
friend, or guardian ad litem under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), 
an incompetent individual should be permitted to pursue an application 
in immigration court with similar procedural due process protections. 
This type of bifurcated analysis should apply where the application can 
only be granted by the immigration court and not by UCSIS if the removal 
proceeding is terminated. As noted above, cancellation of removal, asylum 
(if USCIS has already made a determination), withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture exemplify these types of 
applications.
 These reasons support a substantive right not to be deported 
while incompetent, but should not rule out being able to apply for legal 
status. The process of pursuing an application such as asylum or 
cancellation of removal does not raise questions about the respondent’s 
moral understanding of wrongdoing and penalization. Moreover, the risk 
associated with an error is minimal because entry of a deportation order 
would still be prohibited if the application were denied. In other words, a 
denial would simply maintain the status quo. 
321 Applications such as adjustment of status (the process of 
becoming a permanent resident), which could be filed with USCIS after 
the removal proceeding is terminated, would not require a bifurcated 
hearing.322
 
 320. See Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 
 The removal proceeding would simply be terminated based on 
8, at 458; Bonnie, supra note 58, at 543. 
 321. See supra notes 317–318 and accompanying text; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (stating that, 
with one exception, asylum officers shall not consider applications for withholding of removal, which 
must be decided by an immigration judge); id. § 208.16(b) (stating that individuals in removal 
proceedings may seek protection under the Convention Against Torture).  
 322. The immigration court has jurisdiction over an adjustment application when the applicant is 
in removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R.§ 1245.2(a) (2014). Otherwise, USCIS has jurisdiction over the 
application. Id. § 245.2 (“USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for adjustment of status 
filed by any alien, unless the immigration judge has jurisdiction.”). 
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mental incompetency and the adjustment application would then be filed 
with USCIS. 
The different burdens of proof for deportability and eligibility for 
relief support a bifurcated approach. The government bears the burden 
of establishing deportability by clear and convincing evidence.323 With 
applications for relief, on the other hand, the respondent bears the full 
burden of showing eligibility for the relief sought.324
2. Context-Specific Competency Evaluations 
 The differences in 
these standards underscore how the deportability determination resembles 
a criminal proceeding, where the government brings the charge and bears 
the burden of proof. Applications for relief, on the other hand, remain 
purely in the hands of the respondent, as when a civil litigant seeks a 
remedy from the court. In short, immigration courts serve multiple 
purposes and make different types of decisions. Recognizing a right not 
to be deported while incompetent need not result in depriving 
noncitizens of the ability to pursue legal status in immigration court. 
While a bifurcated approach to competency would be the easiest 
way to handle concerns about applications for relief, another approach is 
to ensure that the competency determination takes into consideration 
“the actual need for client participation in a particular case” and gives 
special weight to the attorney’s judgment regarding the respondent’s 
ability to assist.325 A context-specific assessment of competency is 
consistent with the standard in criminal cases, where competency 
evaluations should consider “whether the accused’s ability to understand 
[and assist with] the process is proportional to the relative complexity 
and severity of the case.”326
For example, a client who cannot give coherent testimony in a 
complicated asylum case may be deemed unable to assist and incompetent, 
but that same client may be found competent in a different type of case 





 323. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2014); Proceedings to Determine 
Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). 
 This interpretation is consistent with Indiana v. 
 324. See, e.g., In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 251–52 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
373, 386 (B.I.A. 2002). 
 325. Bonnie, supra note 58, at 564 (recommending approaches that “would substitute the 
attorney’s informed judgment about the client’s competence (in relation to the actual need for client 
participation in the particular case) for the formal evaluation and, possibly, adjudication, which are 
now thought to be required”). 
 326. King, supra note 288, at 232 (citing ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 7-4.1, 
7-5.1, 7-5.2, 7-5.4, supra note 288). 
 327. In the criminal context, “the same person at the same mental stage might be competent to 
proceed to trial in a drug possession case but be incompetent to stand trial in a complex conspiracy 
case.” King, supra note 288, at 232. 
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Edwards, which instructs “judges to take realistic account of the particular 
defendant’s mental capacities” in order to make a competency 
determination that is “more fine-tuned” and “tailored to the individualized 
circumstances of a particular defendant.”328
A competency determination should also recognize that the 
respondent’s attorney is often in the best position to judge whether the 
respondent is able to assist given the specific nature of the case and the 
level of participation needed.
 
329 Attorneys usually spend far more time 
with their clients than outside evaluators, and the unique nature of their 
conversations with clients provides the most relevant experience for 
assessing the client’s ability to assist in the manner that a given case 
requires. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “defense counsel will 
often have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate 
in his defense.”330
VI.  Alternatives to a Right to Competence 
 Giving special weight to the attorney’s judgment of the 
client’s ability to assist also shows respect for the attorney-client 
relationship and the attorney’s ethical duty of zealous representation. 
Construing competency in this way should create space for attorneys to 
proceed with a case when they believe that they can prevail despite the 
client’s mental disabilities. 
Those who remain wary of recognizing a right to competence 
because they think it goes too far, exposes clients to even greater dangers 
than deportation, or does not permit enough strategic flexibility may be 
interested in alternative ways to protect the interests of clients with 
serious mental disabilities. This Part sets forth three alternatives and 
explains the potential problems with each approach. 
A. Discretionary Termination by Immigration Judges 
One alternative is for immigration judges to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether to terminate a case based on the respondent’s 
incompetence.331
 
 328. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008). John King has argued that Dusky anticipates 
this interpretation of competency by “suggesting that the standard for competency could vary based 
upon the nature of the proceedings the defendant faces.” King, supra note 
 Termination is superior to administrative closure, which 
288, at 232 (citing Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960) (per curiam)). 
 329. See Bonnie, supra note 58, at 546 (arguing that the attorney is in the best position to decide 
whether the defendant’s competency should be evaluated and noting that this is not the same as saying 
that the attorney can “waive” a defendant’s right not to be convicted while incompetent). 
 330. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450–51 (1992) (holding that allocating the burden of proof 
to the defendant to show incompetence does not offend due process). 
 331. See Molly Bowen, Note, Avoiding an “Unavoidably Imperfect Situation”: Searching for 
Strategies to Divert Mentally Ill People Out of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
473, 489–502 (2012) (proposing termination by immigration judges and prosecutorial discretion as two 
ways to avoid subjecting mentally ill people to removal proceedings). 
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simply involves taking a case off of the court’s calendar temporarily 
because it would ensure that detained respondents are released.332 Some of 
the plaintiffs in the Franco-Gonzalez litigation, for example, languished 
in detention for years even after having their cases administratively 
closed. While DHS’s new policy should give all incompetent detainees 
the right to a bond hearing after 180 days, that does not mean that the 
bond will be granted.333
The initial problem with this proposal for discretionary termination is 
that it remains unclear whether an immigration judge even has the 
authority to terminate a case unless DHS agrees.
 A judge may still find that the respondent is a 
danger to the community and refuse to set a bond. In other cases, the 
judge may set a high bond and the respondent may not have the means 
to post it. Termination is the only way to ensure that prolonged 
detention does not occur. Termination also opens the door to applying 
for certain types of legal status that cannot be obtained while in removal 
proceedings. 
334 In re M-A-M- mentions 
only administrative closure as a safeguard.335 Moreover, although the BIA 
recently held that an immigration judge has the authority to 
administratively close a case over the opposition of DHS, it has never 
reversed its longstanding position that an immigration judge lacks the 
power to terminate over DHS’s opposition.336
 
 332. For example, naturalization applications cannot be adjudicated while in removal proceedings. 
See Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013); In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
103, 107 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 As the Ninth Circuit 
 333. See INA § 236(a) (Stating that an immigration judge may decide to continue to detain the 
noncitizen or set a bond of at least $1500); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing that, in order to be released 
on bond, a criminal noncitizen must demonstrate that she is not a threat to national security, that she 
does not pose a danger to others, and that she is not a flight risk); id. § 1236.1(c)(8) (same); see also In 
re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 576 (B.I.A. 2003) (finding that neither the INA nor the applicable 
regulations confer on the alien the right to release on bond). 
 334. The Immigration Judge Benchbook states that it remains an open question whether or not an 
immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to assure fundamental fairness consistent with 
the Due Process Clause. The Immigration Judge Benchbook: Mental Health Issues, Exec. Off. for 
Immigr. Rev., Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook. 
 335. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 483 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 336. See In re Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971) (“If enforcement officials of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service choose to initiate proceedings against a deportable alien and 
prosecute those proceedings to a conclusion, the special inquiry officer under 8 CFR 242.8 has no 
discretionary authority to terminate.”); In re Geronimo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 680, 681 (B.I.A. 1971) 
(“Where [deportation] proceedings have been begun, it is not the province of the special inquiry 
officer (or of this Board on appeal) to review the wisdom of the District Director’s action in starting 
the proceedings, but to determine whether the deportation charge is sustained by the requisite 
evidence.”); In re Vizcarra-Delgadillo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 51, 55 (B.I.A. 1968) (holding that the special 
inquiry officer had authority to terminate proceedings as “improvidently begun” in a case where 
termination was reasonable and both parties agreed to the motion to dismiss); In re Quintero, 18 I. & 
N. Dec. 348, 349–50 (B.I.A. 1982) (noting that termination is not a proper means to delay an alien’s 
deportation); In re Singh, 21 I. & N. Dec. 427, 435 (B.I.A. 1996) (“As long as the [government] 
chooses to prosecute the applicant’s proceedings to a conclusion, the Immigration Judges and this 
Board must order the applicant excluded and deported if the evidence supports such a finding.”); In re 
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explained decades ago, an “immigration judge is not empowered to 
review the wisdom of the INS in instituting the proceedings.”337 Rather, 
“[the judge’s] powers are sharply limited, usually to the determination of 
whether grounds for deportation charges are sustained by the requisite 
evidence or whether there has been abuse by the INS in its exercise of 
particular discretionary powers.”338 The current regulation regarding 
termination of proceedings by an immigration judge mentions only 
termination “to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending 
application or petition for naturalization.”339 Consequently, although 
some immigration judges have taken the initiative to terminate where the 
respondent is incompetent, many will not do so unless DHS agrees.340
Federal courts that disagree with the BIA’s position on termination 
may look to a line of cases in the Second Circuit holding that removal 
proceedings should be terminated whenever regulatory violations 
occurred during the hearing that affect fundamental rights derived from 




Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I. & N. Dec. 43, 45 (B.I.A. 2012) (“[A]n Immigration Judge may terminate 
proceedings when the DHS cannot sustain the charges or in other specific circumstances consistent 
with the law and applicable regulations”). 
 In reaching this conclusion, the 
 337. Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that the BIA’s decisions 
“plainly hold that the immigration judge is without discretionary authority to terminate deportation 
proceedings so long as enforcement officials of the INS choose to initiate proceedings against a 
deportable alien and prosecute those proceedings to a conclusion”). 
 338. See id.; see also Yao v. INS, 2 F.3d 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1993) (“As the BIA points out, the IJ was 
not empowered to terminate or suspend proceedings once initiated.”). 
 339. Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013). This part of the 
regulation resembles former 8 CFR § 242.7, which provided a special inquiry officer the discretion to 
terminate a deportation proceeding only to permit a noncitizen “to proceed to a final hearing on a 
pending application or petition for naturalization,” as long as the noncitizen established “prima facie 
eligibility for naturalization” and the case must involve “exceptionally appealing or humanitarian 
factors.” See In re Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971); see also In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
103, 106 (B.I.A. 2007) (discussing when termination is appropriate based on a pending naturalization 
application). DHS, on the other hand, is empowered to cancel a notice to appear in a broad range of 
situations, including where the notice was “improvidently issued” or where “[c]ircumstances of the case 
have changed after the notice to appear was issued to such an extent that continuation is no longer in the 
best interest of the government.” See Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a)(6)–
(7); see also id. § 1239.2(c); In re W-C-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 118, 122 (B.I.A. 2007) (stating that once 
jurisdiction vests with an immigration judge, a notice to appear cannot be cancelled by the DHS, which 
must instead move for dismissal of the matter on the basis of a ground set forth in the regulations). 
 340. For example, an immigration judge sua sponte terminated removal proceedings in the case of 
Ever Francisco Martinez-Rivas, a lawful permanent resident from El Salvador who was one of the 
plaintiffs in the Franco-Gonzalez litigation, after finding that his schizophrenia rendered him 
incompetent and made it impossible to go forward with the proceeding. See Franco-Gonzalez v. 
Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Federal District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee 
indicated that the immigration judge had correctly terminated the proceedings. Id. at 1048 (“To her 
credit, the Immigration Judge terminated the removal proceedings after recognizing that she could not 
go forward with the proceeding given Martinez’s mental condition.”). 
 341. See Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166–70 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the Accardi Doctrine, 
named after a Supreme Court decision that vacated a deportation order because the procedure did not 
conform to the regulations); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen a regulation is 
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Second Circuit reasoned that the “notion of fair play animating [the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause] precludes an agency from promulgating 
a regulation affecting individual liberty or interest, which the rule-maker 
may then with impunity ignore or disregard as it sees fit.”342 Applying 
similar logic, courts could find that removal proceedings should be 
terminated if the respondent is deprived of the statutory right to “a 
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [her], to present 
evidence on [her] own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented 
by the Government.”343
Another option would be for Congress to amend the INA—or for 
DOJ to amend the regulations—to specifically give immigration judges 
the authority to terminate based on incompetency or, more generally, to 
terminate over DHS’s opposition. Once immigration judges have this 
authority, attorneys could seek termination for incompetent clients on a 
case-by-case basis. While this would allow attorneys to make strategic 
decisions about whether to pursue relief or request termination, it would 
also give judges enormous discretionary power. Some judges may be 
sympathetic and agree to termination, but others may refuse. Empirical 
research has documented huge variations in how often judges grant 
asylum cases, so it would not be surprising to find similar variations in 
other types of discretionary decisions.
 Because incompetent respondents cannot 
exercise these rights, their cases could then be terminated. 
344
B. Prosecutorial Discretion by the Department of Homeland 
Security 
 Numerous judges have not 
hesitated to issue deportation orders against respondents with obvious 
and severe mental disabilities. Their perspective and practice may not 
change simply because they are now given the authority to terminate. 
Another alternative is for DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion 
with individuals who have serious mental disabilities.345
 
promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, and the 
INS fails to adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid and a remand to the agency 
is required.”); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
 DHS could do 
this at several different points: ICE officials could decide not to issue a 
Notice to Appear when someone shows signs of incompetence; ICE 
could decide not to detain that individual; a trial attorney could decide to 
retract the Notice to Appear after realizing, perhaps in court, that the 
 342. Montilla, 926 F.2d at 164. 
 343. INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2014). 
 344. See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Routlette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007). 
 345. See Bowen, supra note 331, at 494–502 (discussing prosecutorial discretion as a way to divert 
mentally ill individuals from removal proceedings). 
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respondent may be incompetent;346
Exercising prosecutorial discretion in this way would be consistent 
with the immigration enforcement priorities set forth in the 2011 Morton 
Memos, which require ICE to prioritize who should be deported due to 
the agency’s limited resources. These memos require ICE to consider 
“whether the person . . . suffers from severe mental or physical illness” 
and specifically mentions “individuals who suffer from a serious mental 
or physical disability” among the classes of people who “warrant 
particular care.”
 or the trial attorney could agree to 
termination of the case by the immigration judge. A stronger version of 
this proposal is for DHS to establish a presumption that prosecutorial 
discretion should be exercised in favor of termination in cases in which 
the respondent is incompetent. The presumption would act as a policy 
that would guide all trial attorneys, instead of leaving it to each 
individual’s discretion. 
347 Exercising prosecutorial discretion would also conserve 
tremendous government resources. Under the new DHS/DOJ policy, 
pursuing the deportation of individuals with serious mental disabilities will 
become much more costly, requiring professional competency evaluations, 
competency hearings, and appointed representatives at the government’s 
expense. Terminating these cases early on as soon as indicia of 
incompetence become apparent—or not filing charges in the first place if 
the person is known to have a serious mental disability—would conserve 
resources at a time when DHS and DOJ are both experiencing significant 
budget cuts.348
DHS may be reluctant to exercise prosecutorial discretion, however, 
if some of the negative factors mentioned in the Morton Memos are also 
present, such as cases involving “serious felons, repeat offenders, or 
 
 
 346. See Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a)(6)–(7) (2014) (allowing DHS 
to cancel a notice to appear after jurisdiction has vested with the immigration court where the notice 
was “improvidently issued” or where “[c]ircumstances of the case have changed after the notice to 
appear was issued to such an extent that continuation is no longer in the best interest of the 
government”); id. § 239.2 (setting forth grounds on which the DHS may cancel a notice to appear prior 
to jurisdiction vesting with the immigration judge). 
 347. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All 
Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, on Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 4–5 (June 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 348. Doing Business with the U.S. Marshals Service: Notice to Vendors Regarding Sequestration, 
U.S. Marshals Serv., http://www.justice.gov/marshals/business (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (“Within 
the Department of Justice, sequestration will result in a reduction of over $1.6 billion from the Fiscal 
Year 2013 funding level.”); Written Testimony for a House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency Hearing Titled “The Impact of Sequestration 
on Homeland Security: Scare Tactics or Possible Threat?”, DHS Mgmt. Directorate, U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot., & U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
news/2013/04/12/written-testimony-dhs-mgmt-cbp-ice-and-tsa-house-homeland-security-subcommittee 
(mentioning $3.2 billion in budget reductions). 
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individuals with a lengthy criminal history of any kind,” or “individuals 
with an egregious record of immigration violations.”349 Individuals who 
entered recently or have any criminal record might also be disfavored.350 
In cases where such negative factors are present, DHS could take the 
position that discretion is not warranted. So far, DHS has generally been 
reluctant to exercise discretion. After reviewing almost 300,000 cases 
from November 2011 to May 2012, DHS found only seven percent of the 
cases eligible for administrative closure, although the numbers could be 
greater going forward.351
C. A Reasonable Accommodation Approach 
 Relying on prosecutorial discretion is therefore 
likely to protect some but not all mentally incompetent individuals. The 
power to agree to termination or administrative closure in any given case 
would remain entirely in the hands of DHS. Recognizing a constitutional 
right to competence, on the other hand, would provide protection across 
the board. 
The reasonable accommodation theory that prevailed in Franco-
Gonzales was an original and creative argument. While that argument 
has not yet been reviewed by the Ninth Circuit or raised in other federal 
courts, it prompts interesting questions about the relationships between 
reasonable accommodations and substantive due process. On the one 
hand, a reasonable accommodation approach seems to conflict with some 
of the arguments set forth above for why individuals in removal 
proceedings should have a right to competence. It suggests, for example, 
that the appointment of an attorney “level[s] the playing field,” placing 
an incompetent individual on equal footing with competent individuals.352
 
 349. Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 
 
As discussed above, however, an attorney often cannot overcome the 
obstacles presented by incompetency. The reasonable accommodation 
approach is also limiting insofar as it suggests that only incompetent 
individuals in removal proceedings need attorneys to actualize their due 
process rights. This Article has explained why those who fail to meet a 
347, at 5. 
 350. Id. at 4 (stating that length of presence in the United States is a relevant factor). 
 351. See Prosecutorial Discretion: A Statistical Assessment, Immigration Policy Ctr. (June 11, 
2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/prosecutorial-discretion-statistical-analysis; see also 
Prosecutorial Discretion Closed 1 in 4 Cases in Seattle, San Diego, Charlotte Immigration Courts, 
TRAC (Aug. 12, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/whatsnew/email.130812.html. While the national figure is 
seven percent, the percentage is much higher in certain immigration courts. Id. 
 352. In rejecting the defendants’ argument that appointment of counsel would place mentally 
incompetent detainees in a significantly better position than competent noncitizens in removal 
proceedings, the court explained that providing a representative “is merely the means by which 
Plaintiffs may exercise the same benefits as other non-disabled individuals, and not the benefit itself.” 
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2013 WL 3674492, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In other words, appointing the 
representative “serves only to level the playing field by allowing [mentally incompetent detainees] to 
meaningfully access the hearing process.” Id. at *8. 
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heightened standard of competence necessary for self-representation 
should be appointed attorneys. Moreover, some commentators have 
argued that due process requires everyone facing deportation to be 
appointed counsel, given the complexities of immigration law and the 
extraordinary difficulty that even the most competent individuals face 
when forced to navigate this system pro se.353
On the other hand, there are also ways that a reasonable 
accommodation approach may support the types of arguments articulated 
above. One of the Supreme Court’s most important disability rights cases, 
Tennessee v. Lane, suggests that a substantive right can emerge from a 
conglomeration of procedural rights. Lane involved two paraplegic 
plaintiffs who could not access Tennessee courtrooms because the 
buildings lacked wheelchair access. One of the plaintiffs, George Lane, 
crawled up two flights of stairs to attend his first criminal hearing. When 
he refused to crawl or be carried up the stairs for the next hearing, he 
was jailed for failure to appear. The plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, which closely resembles section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, providing that “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation 
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
 
354 The 
issue before the Supreme Court was whether Title II was invalid 
legislation because it abrogated states’ sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment.355
In finding no Eleventh Amendment violation, the Court reasoned 
that Title II sought to enforce not only the equal protection right against 
irrational discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due 
Process Clause, which are subject to more searching judicial review.
 
356 
Specifically, the Court upheld Title II “as it applies to the class of cases 
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”357
 
 353. See, e.g., Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in 
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 393, 425 (2000). For a thorough review of the 
literature on appointment of counsel for noncitizens in removal proceedings, see Eagly, supra note 
 The Court 
extracted this fundamental right of access to courts from a conglomeration 
of rights, including: (1) the right of a criminal defendant to be present at all 
9. 
 354. Americans with Disabilities Act § 202, 28 U.S.C. § 12132 (2014). By comparison, section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act similarly provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States, as defined in section 705 (20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, 
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).  
 355. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514–15 (2004) 
 356. See id. at 522–23. 
 357. Id. at 533–34. 
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critical stages of a trial;358 (2) the right of civil litigants to have a 
“meaningful opportunity to be heard”;359 (3) the right of criminal 
defendants to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community;360 
and (4) the right of members of the public to access criminal 
proceedings.361 These four rights all implicate procedural due process, yet 
the court viewed them in their totality and derived a substantive right of 
access to courts. After identifying the fundamental right at stake, the 
Court concluded that Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
was justified.362
The decision in Lane indicates that constitutional due process 
concerns may underlie the duty to provide reasonable accommodations 
or, conversely, that the duty to accommodate helps preserve the due 
process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, a disability 
rights approach to mental incompetency is not completely distinct from a 
 
 
 358. See id. at 523 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)); see also Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137–38 (1934) (holding that procedural due process protects a defendant’s 
right to be present during the view of the scene of the crime, which is part of the trial). 
 359. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see also 
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 (holding that procedural due process “prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely 
because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their 
marriages”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding that Mississippi statutes requiring a 
mother to pay $2,352.36 in record preparation fees to pursue her appeal challenging termination of her 
parental rights violated due process and equal protection). 
 360. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)) (holding that 
women as a class may not be excluded from jury service or given automatic exemptions based solely 
on sex if the consequence is that criminal juries are male). In finding that the fair cross section 
requirement is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the court drew on 
cases involving due process and equal protection challenges to jury-selection systems. Taylor 
effectively overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 68–69 (1961), which had rejected the contention that 
a system like Louisiana’s deprived a defendant of due process and equal protection. See Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 828 n.1 (1991) (recognizing that Taylor effectively overruled Hoyt); see 
also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (“These principles compel the conclusion that a State 
cannot, consistent with due process, subject a defendant to indictment or trial by a jury that has been 
selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”); Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396 (2010) (Thomas J., concurring) (quoting 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 372 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)) (opining that Taylor rests less on the 
Sixth Amendment than on an “amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 361. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 7 
(1986)). While Press-Enterprise held that the First Amendment protects the public’s right to access 
criminal proceedings, due process concerns were also implied. The Court observed, “one of the 
important means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers.” Press-Enter. 
Co., 478 U.S. at 7. The Court also characterized the right to an open public trial as “a shared right of 
the accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness.” Id. 
 362. The Court found that Title II’s requirement of program accessibility was congruent and 
proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts. In other words, Congress had 
the authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity in 
order to enforce that Amendment’s substantive guarantees. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34. 
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substantive due process approach.363
Conclusion 
 While Lane involved physical 
barriers that deprived people of their fundamental right of access to 
court, substantive due process could also be invoked to support a finding 
that mental barriers—such as incompetency—deprive individuals of their 
right to a reasonably fair removal proceeding. In short, thinking about 
the rights of mentally incompetent respondents through the lens of 
disability rights might have certain limitations, but it might also open the 
door to novel ways of understanding the relationship between procedural 
and substantive due process. This approach therefore merits further 
thought and exploration. 
Until now, discussions about the rights of noncitizens with serious 
mental disabilities have been limited to procedural due process concerns, 
mainly emphasizing the need for appointed counsel. This Article hopes 
to add an important new dimension to the debate by arguing for a 
substantive due process right to competence in removal proceedings. If 
federal courts are not willing to recognize this constitutional right, then 
Congress could create an analogous statutory right. The bottom line is that 
the same reasons that underlie the prohibition against trial of criminal 
defendants provide strong support for prohibiting the deportation of 
incompetent individuals. Courts should not turn a blind eye to these 
compelling reasons simply because removal proceedings are technically 
labeled civil. Rather, they should consider the reality of what is at stake, 
as many states have done in the context of juvenile adjudications. 
Recognizing a right to competence in removal proceedings would 
impact only a small fraction of cases. Thus, the DHS need not fear that 
recognizing this right would obstruct immigration enforcement. For many 
individuals with mental disabilities, procedural due process protections will 
suffice. These procedural protections can be tailored based on the nature 
and severity of a given individual’s disabilities. At least two groups, 
however, require special attention in order to preserve the fairness, 
accuracy, and dignity of the proceedings. First, those who are legally 
incompetent under the Dusky/Drope standard should never be subjected 
to removal proceedings. Second, those who fail to meet a higher standard 
of competence necessary for self-representation should not be subjected 
to removal proceedings unless they are appointed counsel. While 
discretionary termination and prosecutorial discretion are alternatives, 
they fail to provide across-the-board protections for mentally incompetent 
 
 363. Jessica L. Roberts, An Area of Refuge: Due Process Analysis and Emergency Evacuation for 
People with Disabilities, 13 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 127, 147 (2005) (arguing that a substantive due 
process model will come closer than an equal protection model to achieving the equality of treatment for 
disabled persons intended by Congress in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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individuals. Moreover, a disability rights framework imparts new 
inspiration and invites further exploration but does not recognize that 
simply providing representation to a respondent who cannot assist fails to 
resolve concerns about the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings. In 
short, only a two-tiered right to competence will protect the most 
vulnerable subset of individuals from potentially errant deportations. 
 
